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REPORTS

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SECRET

necessary for them to have in order to carry out the mission assigned to them. They in turn will impart to subordinates only such information as may be necessary for them to carry out their instructions.

(4) Advise non-military agencies with regard to any project which they are contemplating which would interfere with current or projected military or naval operations.

(5) Coordinate its activities, through the commanders in the field, with corresponding Security Control agencies of Allied nations involved in the military operations concerned.

(6) Obtain such strategic and tactical guidance from the Joint Staff Planners as is necessary to carry out its functions.

SECRET**Procedure**

1. Joint Security Control shall:

a. With regard to the prevention of information of military value falling in the hands of the enemy:

(1) Make periodic incidental inspections to see that security measures which have been adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and the War and Navy Departments are complied with.

(2) Report to appropriate officials violations of security regulations which have been adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and the War and Navy Departments.

b. With regard to timing the implementation of those portions of cover and deception plans which must be performed by military and non-military agencies in the United States:

(1) Furnish such information to non-military war agencies such as the State Department, Office of War Information, Board of Economic Warfare, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Treasury Department, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, War Shipping Administration, as may be necessary for them to have in order to carry out missions assigned to them in the implementation of cover and deception plans.

(2) Carry out its functions by the issuance of directives to military agencies and by cooperation with non-military agencies.

(3) In utilizing any of the non-military agencies listed in (1) above, deal only with one or two persons at the highest level of the agency concerned. If assistance is to be sought from those agencies maintaining cover and deception plans, the specially selected persons will be given only such information as is

(c) Control the reference to current or projected operations in correspondence by any available means of communication.

(d) Guard the secrecy of new weapons, inventions, projects and other military secrets directly or indirectly connected with military and naval materiel and operations.

2. With regard to timing the implementation of those portions of cover and deception plans which must be performed by military and non-military agencies in the United States:

(1) Inform military and non-military governmental agencies within the United States of missions assigned to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out portions of cover and deception plans prepared by the Joint Staff Planners or the commanders of the operation concerned.

(2) Follow up on the execution of the mission assigned to (1) above.

(3) Recommend to the Joint Staff Planners any action which it (Joint Security Control) believes would further the cover and deception desired for current or projected operations.

3. With regard to questions of security classification:

(1) Act for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the settlement of such matters between the U.S. military services.

(2) Represent and act for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in settlement of such matters affecting other government agencies, utilizing the services of the Security Advisory Board as appropriate.

(3) Represent and act for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the settlement of such matters between the United States military services and foreign government agencies.

SECRETDIRECTIVEJOINT SECURITY CONTROLOrganization

1. The Joint Security Control (J.S.C.) is the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization charged, in so far as is set forth hereafter, with:

a. Preventing information of military value from falling into the hands of the enemy.

b. Guiding the implementation of those portions of cover and deception plans which must be performed by military and non-military agencies in the United States.

Responsibilities

2. Joint Security Control will continue to be implemented by the Military Intelligence Service and A-2 of the War Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department.

Functions

3. Joint Security Control shall:

a. With regard to the prevention of information of military value falling into the hands of the enemy:

(1) Recommend to appropriate officials the security measures to be carried out within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and the War and Navy Departments.

These will include measures to:

(a) Determine who shall be furnished information concerning specific plans, dates, and plans for current and projected operations, and when information is to be given.

(b) Veto publicity which may jeopardize the success of current or projected operations or procedures incident thereto.

COPY NO. 121

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J.C.S. 234/2/D

17 April 1948

Revised 14 May 1951.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL

References: a. J.C.S. 66th Mtg., Item 5
b. J.C.S. 802/1

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is the charter for the Joint Security Control as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S. 234/2/D), and subsequently amended by action of the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff as J.C.S. 802/1.

A. J. McFARLAND,
E. D. GRAVES, JR.,
Joint Secretariat

JSC

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL

The Joint Security Control is an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with preventing information of military value from falling into the hands of the enemy, and with such other duties as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

The Office of Strategic Services is an operating agency of the government under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This agency is charged with the functions of collecting and analyzing such strategic information as may be required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military operations and with planning and conducting special operations not assigned to other government agencies.

DISCUSSION

6. Since complete agreement on all matters cannot be reached, the Joint Logistics Committee, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

7. The Joint Logistics Committee is authorized to accept the requests and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with their duties and, reciprocally, will furnish information and assistance as appropriate to such agencies.

1. Purpose

To advise the Joint Staff Planners in the consideration and preparation of joint war plans as to the logistic implications of such plans in order that the Joint Staff Planners may have the integration of logistics with strategy in the preparation of joint war plans.

To prepare logistic plans for implementing the war plans approved by the Joint Staff Planners.

To advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff Planners concerning the logistic implications of proposed operations relating to joint and combined operations.

To advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to agencies of the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies.

To coordinate the information required in the preparation of studies relating to the execution of plans.

To advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Combined Logistics Committee.

The Combined Logistics Committee shall:

1. Establish its own method of procedure.

2. Recommend members from personnel of the Army and Navy, as requested, to assist in the performance of its duties.

3. Recommend to the Maritime Commission will be requested to assist when appropriate.

4. Advise and inform the Joint Staff Planners, normally by memorandum, in order to insure that matters under its consideration are handled in accordance with approved joint war plans.

5. Represent decisions as to joint operations. Representatives of the Joint Staff Planners may be invited to attend meetings of the Combined Logistics Committee.

Joint Staff Planners in the consideration of joint war plans as to the logistic implications of logistics with strategy in joint war plans.

Joint Staff Planners.

The Joint Staff and the Joint Staff Planners shall be responsible for the logistic implications of proposed joint and combined operations. The Joint Staff shall provide advice and information to other agencies of Staff and to agencies of the Department and other governmental agencies in the preparation of studies of joint operations.

The Joint Staff on the Combined Operations.

The Committee shall:

1. be composed of personnel of the Army and Navy,

2. be composed of personnel of the Army and Navy, and

3. be composed of personnel of the Army and Navy, and

4. be composed of personnel of the Army and Navy, and

5. be composed of personnel of the Army and Navy, and

6. be composed of personnel of the Army and Navy, and

ENCLOSURE**SECRET****JOINT LOGISTICS COMMITTEE**

The Joint Logistics Committee (J.L.C.) is hereby established as a permanent advisory and planning agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, replacing the Joint Administrative Committee, which is hereby cancelled. In addition, the J.L.C. shall be under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and shall be subject to the policies thereof.

The J.L.C. will consist of:

One representative of the Army, of whom one will be the Chairman.

One representative of the Navy.

One representative of the Marine Corps.

The Maritime Commission will be invited to attend the meetings of the Committee, but shall not have voting matters affecting that agency.

The Chairman of the Joint Logistics Committee is authorized to call a meeting of the Joint Logistics Committee or any subcommittee thereof, he will be represented by the Chairman of the subcommittee.

The J.L.C. shall have planning powers.

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(J.C.S. 202/29, 2)

12 October 1943

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CHARTER

JOINT LOGISTICS COMMITTEE

Reference: 116th Meeting, Item 2

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Logistics Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 116th Meeting. This CHARTER supersedes the CHARTER for the Joint Administrative Committee contained in J.C.S. 202/10/2.

F. B. ROYAL,

A. J. McFARLAND,

Joint Secretariat.

FUNCTIONSFUNCTIONS

6. The Joint Logistics Plans Committee shall:

- a. Prepare plans, studies, and estimates as directed by the Joint Logistics Committee.
- b. Prepare such additional plans, studies, and estimates, upon their own initiative, as they feel that the situation demands.
- c. Submit completed plans, studies, and estimates to the Joint Logistics Committee.
- d. Work in close liaison with the Joint War Plans Committee to the end that the resulting logistics plans will properly implement the war plans.

7. The Joint Logistics Plans Committee shall:

- a. Establish its own procedure.
- b. Enter upon all deliberations with instructions from no source other than the Joint Logistics Committee jointly, and be guided in its deliberations by the policies prescribed in J.O.S. 318/3, "General Policies for Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization."

c. Meet with the Joint Logistics Committee at frequent intervals for the purpose of presenting their views, seeking advice, and requesting decisions from the Joint Logistics Committee, relating to plans or studies under preparation.

8. The Joint Logistics Plans Committee is authorized to request all service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT LOGISTICS PLANS COMMITTEEORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Logistics Plans Committee (J.L.P.C.) is hereby established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a working committee of the Joint Logistics Committee.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Logistics Plans Committee will consist of designated permanent and associate members of the logistics agencies of the War and Navy Departments.

3. There will be six permanent members, three from the Army and three from the Navy selected from:

- a. Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- b. Army Service Forces.
- c. Army Air Forces.
- d. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. The permanent members shall constitute a control group to direct, coordinate and supervise the work of the Committee. This will be their primary duty, and they will be provided with permanent office facilities.

5. Associate members will be designated by the Joint Logistics Committee from officers available in the War and Navy Departments. Their services shall be employed as required to assist the permanent members in the solution of problems or when they have special knowledge.

COPY NO. 106608

- (1) JCS 450
- (2) JPS 279/D
- (3) JSSC 27
- (4) JCS 450/1
- (5) JCS 450/2
- (6) JCS 450/3
- (7) JSSC 27/1
- (8) JCS 450/4
- (9) JAdC 74
- (10) JCS 450/5
- (11) JCS 450/6

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT LOGISTICS PLANS COMMITTEENotes by the Secretaries

This document is the CHARTER for the Joint Logistics Plans Committee as approved by the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff acting for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. B. ROYAL,

A. J. McFARLAND,

Joint Secretariat.

MEMORANDUM**PETROLEUM**

1. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall:

- a. Establish its own method of procedure.
- b. Implement its agreed decisions except upon matters of major policy.
- c. Establish an organization of officers detailed from the Army and the Navy to carry out the functions prescribed. The Executive Officer will be an officer of the Navy.

2. Since complete agreement on all matters can not be expected, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

3. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board is authorized to request all service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties.

RESTRICTED

(1) Determine the requirements of petroleum products for the Army and Navy and consolidate these requirements in accordance with appropriate specifications and points of delivery to whatever degree the Board may consider practicable.

(2) Determine, in collaboration with the Petroleum Administrator for War, the capacity of the petroleum industry to provide the established requirements.

(3) Determine upon and designate for each petroleum product the appropriate procuring agency or agencies for both services.

2. Assure the availability of petroleum products in the proper quantity and quality at designated points and at specified times. In the case of petroleum products originating in the United States, advise the Petroleum Administrator for War as to the requirements of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the armed forces of its allies.

3. Effect collaboration on petroleum matters with other United Nations as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. The provisions of paragraphs d and e shall not be interpreted as displacing or affecting in any way the duties of the Aviation Petroleum Products Allocation Committee (A.P.P.A.C.) functioning under the Munitions Assignments Board.

5. Except as initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall not supplant or interfere with the functions of any War or Navy Department agency as presently organized, or of the U. S. Fleet, but the functioning of the Board should result in better coordination of the working of these several agencies and in more efficient services to the armed forces.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERARMY-NAVY PETROLEUM BOARDORGANIZATION

1. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board (A.N.P.B.) is hereby established as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with cognizance of all matters pertaining to petroleum and petroleum products.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board will consist of:
- a. Two general officers of the Army, one of whom shall be from the Army Air Forces.
 - b. Not more than two officers of the Navy.
3. Each of the above members shall have a deputy who shall have plenary powers in the absence of his principal.

FUNCTIONS

4. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall:
- a. Effect close cooperation between the War and Navy Departments on all matters pertaining to petroleum and petroleum products, maintaining close liaison with the Petroleum Coordinator for War.
 - b. Be responsible for the preparation of full information on all matters pertaining to petroleum and petroleum products with which the War and Navy Departments are concerned.
 - c. Insure coordination of procurement, overseas shipment, and storage of petroleum and petroleum products for the Army and Navy.
 - d. In view of the short supply of certain petroleum products, the need to avoid competitive procurement, and the desire to vest procurement authority in the agency best equipped to exercise the authority:

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 112159-21
(J.C.S. 202/21/D)May 11, 1943Pages 1 - 3, incl.159

- (1) J.C.S. 202
- (2) J.C.S. 202/1/D
- (3) J.C.B. 58
- (4) J.T.C. 76/D
- (5) J.I.C. 76/1
- (6) J.P.S. 123
- (7) J.P.S. 123/1
- (8) J.C.S. 202/2
- (9) J.C.S. 202/3
- (10) J.C.S. 202/4
- (11) J.C.S. 202/5
- (12) J.C.S. 202/6
- (13) J.S.S.C. 13
- (14) J.C.S. 202/7
- (15) J.C.S. 202/8
- (16) J.C.S. 202/9
- (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
- (18) J.P.S. 180/D
- (19) J.C.S. 202/11/D
- (20) J.C.S. 202/12/D
- (21) J.C.S. 202/13/D
- (22) J.C.S. 202/14/D
- (23) J.C.S. 202/15/D
- (24) J.C.S. 202/16/D
- (25) J.C.S. 202/17/D
- (26) J.C.S. 202/18/D
- (27) J.C.S. 202/19/D
- (28) J.C.S. 202/20/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERARMY-NAVY PETROLEUM BOARDNote by the Secretaries

The enclosure is the CHARTER for the Army-Navy Petroleum Board as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th meeting. This CHARTER supersedes all charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

P. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretaries.

RESTRICTED

6. Except as initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall not supplant or interfere with the functions of any War or Navy Department agency as presently organized or of the U.S. Fleet, but the functioning of the Board should result in better coordination of the working of these several agencies and in more efficient services to the armed forces.

SECURITY

7. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall:

1. Establish its own method of procedure.
2. Implement its agreed decisions except upon matters of major policy.

2. Establish an organization of officers detailed from the Army and Navy to carry out the functions prescribed.

The Executive Officer will be an officer of the Navy.

3. Seek guidance on strategical plans from the Joint Staff planners and on overall logistic plans from the Joint Logistics Committee.

8. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

9. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board is authorized to request all Service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties, and, reciprocally, will furnish information and assistance as appropriate, to such agencies.

g. In view of the short supply of certain petroleum products, the need to avoid competitive procurement, and the desire to vest procurement authority in the agency best equipped to exercise the authority:

(1) In accordance with overall logistic plans, determine the requirements of petroleum products for the Army and Navy and consolidate these requirements in accordance with appropriate specifications and points of delivery to whatever degree the Board may consider practicable.

(2) Determine, in collaboration with the Petroleum Administrator for War, the capacity of the petroleum industry to provide the established requirements

(3) Determine and designate for each petroleum product the appropriate procuring agency or agencies for such services.

h. Secure the availability of petroleum products in the required quantity and quality at designated points and at designated times as required by overall logistic plans. In the case of petroleum products originating in the United States, advise the Petroleum Administrator for War, as to the requirements of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the armed forces of its Allies.

i. Render collaboration on petroleum matters with other Federal agencies as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

j. Submit necessary information and advice to the Joint Petroleum Committee to enable them to perform their functions in overall logistic planning.

k. The provisions of paragraphs g and h shall not be interpreted as displacing or affecting in any way the duties of the Petroleum Products Allocation Committee (A.P.P.A.C.), functioning under the Munitions Assignments Board.

ENCLOSURECHARTERARMY-NAVY PETROLEUM BOARD

The Army-Navy Petroleum Board (A.N.P.B.) is hereby established by the agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with the responsibility for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for appropriate agencies, relating to petroleum and petroleum products.

The Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall consist of:
 a. One general officer of the Army, one of whom shall be the Chairman.
 b. One general officer of the Air Force.

c. One general officer of the Navy.

d. The above members shall have a deputy who shall act in the absence of his principal.

The Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall:

a. Promote close cooperation between the War and Navy Departments on all matters pertaining to petroleum and petroleum products, maintaining close liaison with the War Relocation Authority for War.

b. Be responsible for the preparation of full information on all matters pertaining to petroleum and petroleum products which the War and Navy Departments are concerned.

c. Have coordination, based on overall logistic plans, of transportation, overseas shipment, and storage of petroleum and petroleum products for the Army and Navy.

COPY NO. 82JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERARMY-NAVY SECRETARY BOARD
11th meeting, Item 2Joint Chiefs of Staff

This document is the REVISED CHARTER for the Army-Navy
Joint Chiefs of Staff in
11th meeting. This CHARTER supersedes J.C.S. 202/21/D.

F. H. ROYAL,

A. J. McFARLAND,

Joint Secretariat.

RESTRICTED

4. Maintain close liaison with the Office of War Mobilization in order to:

(1) Keep the Chiefs of Staff advised with regard to any problems pertaining to the military production programs which are raised by that Office.

(2) Cooperate with that office in the preparation of studies and the submission of recommendations which will result in economies in the over-all production program with as to the use of materiel and the utilization of manpower.

5. Use as a basis for their survey the approved troop bases and projected operations which have been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. The Joint Production Survey Committee shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Present its conclusions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in written memoranda, or orally if so requested.

7. The Joint Production Survey Committee is authorized to request all agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the War and Navy Departments for such information, studies, or estimates as it may require in connection with its duties.

8. The members of the Joint Production Survey Committee are authorized to attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of their supporting agencies.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT PRODUCTION SURVEY COMMITTEEORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Production Survey Committee (J.P.S.C.) is hereby established as the agency charged with advising the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters pertaining to the balancing of production against requirements in accordance with the strategic situation.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Production Survey Committee will consist of not more than two officers of the Army, one of whom shall be from the Army Air Forces, and not more than two officers from the Navy. Representatives from the Office of War Mobilization may be requested to attend meetings of the Committee as associate members when matters of interest to the Office of War Mobilization are under consideration.

3. The members of the Joint Production Survey Committee will not be regularly assigned to other duties and shall be responsible both individually and collectively only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. The Joint Production Survey Committee shall:

a. Keep the production programs and reserve stocks of the military services, including International Aid, under constant survey and advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) As to adjustments indicated in the light of the military situation.

(2) As to adjustments in requirements and stock levels indicated by the information contained in experience tables and other pertinent data.

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(T.S.N. 201/26/D)

21 September 1963

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(1) JCS 202	(20) JCS 202/12/D
(2) JCS 202/1/D	(21) JCS 202/13/D
(3) JCS 58	(22) JCS 202/14/D
(4) JIC 76/D	(23) JCS 202/15/D
(5) JIC 76/1	(24) JCS 202/16/D
(6) JPS 123	(25) JCS 202/17/D
(7) JPS 123/1	(26) JCS 202/18/D
(8) JCS 202/2	(27) JCS 202/19/D
(9) JCS 202/3	(28) JCS 202/20/D
(10) JCS 202/4	(29) JCS 202/21/D
(11) JCS 202/5	(30) JCS 202/22/D
(12) JCS 202/6	(31) JMT 20/D
(13) JSSC 13	(32) JIC 76/2/D
(14) JCS 202/7	(33) JCS 202/23
(15) JCS 202/8	(34) JCS 202/24/D
(16) JCS 202/9	(35) JCS 202/25/D
(17) JCS 202/10/D	(Revised)
(18) JPS 180/D	(36) JCS 202/26
(19) JCS 202/11/D	

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT PRODUCTION SURVEY COMMITTEENote by the Secretaries

The enclosure is the charter for the Joint Production Survey Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 115th meeting, this date.

J. R. PLANE

P. B. ROYAL

Joint Secretariat

RESTRICTED

n. Serve as the U. S. Secretary of the Combined Secretariat.

5. Members of the Joint Secretariat shall serve as members of the Combined Secretariat when the agencies to which they are assigned deal with combined matters.

PROCEDURES

6. The Secretary shall establish the procedure for the Joint Secretariat.

7. In the performance of his duties, the Secretary will be assisted, as he directs, by the Deputy Secretary, the Executive Secretary, the Supply Secretary, and such other officers as may be assigned.

8. The members of the Joint Secretariat will maintain close liaison with the Secretary and with each other in order to assist in the coordination of the work of the agencies within the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization.

INSTRUCTIONS

handled without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or which requires study and recommendations prior to its consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. Follow up action taken in accordance with c. and d. above in order to assure that appropriate effectuating measures have been or are being taken, and maintain a record thereof.

f. Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff any action, which, in his opinion, will improve the functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization.

g. Supervise the activities of the Joint Secretariat in order to coordinate the work of the agencies within the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization.

h. Ensure that all papers presented for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are as clear and concise as possible. If in his opinion any revision is necessary, the Secretary is authorized to change the form but not the substance of these papers. He will refer each revised report to the originating agency in order that it may be assured that there has been no change in substance.

i. Act in a liaison capacity between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various non-military governmental agencies.

j. Act in liaison capacity between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Missions of other Nations.

k. Assign secretaries and provide such other officers, enlisted and clerical personnel as may be required for the proper functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization.

l. Provide for the reproduction and distribution of all official papers of the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization, maintain a record thereof, and provide for their security.

m. Maintain the Combined Chiefs of Staff Building and provide for its security.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT SECRETARIATORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Secretariat is hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization charged with the performance of secretarial and such other duties as may be prescribed.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Secretariat will consist of:

- a. The Secretary.
- b. The Deputy Secretary.
- c. The Executive Secretary.
- d. Additional secretaries to assist the Secretary and to serve supporting agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Members of the Joint Secretariat will be officers of appropriate rank selected from the Army and the Navy. If more than one secretary is appointed to any one agency, each service should be represented.

FUNCTIONS

4. The Secretary shall:

- a. Make necessary preparations for and attend all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Record the minutes of the proceedings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when meeting by themselves or with non-military agencies.
- c. Take such action as may be appropriate to implement decisions and policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff.
- d. Refer to appropriate agencies all matters which are referred to the Joint Secretariat.

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 37159-20
(J.C.S. 202/22/D)

MAY 11, 1943

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- (1) J.C.S. 202
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 - (6) J.P.S. 123
 - (7) J.P.S. 123/1
 - (8) J.C.S. 202/2
 - (9) J.C.S. 202/3
 - (10) J.C.S. 202/4
 - (11) J.C.S. 202/5
 - (12) J.C.S. 202/6
 - (13) J.S.S.C. 13
 - (14) J.C.S. 202/7
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 - (16) J.C.S. 202/9
 - (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
 - (18) J.P.S. 180/D
 - (19) J.C.S. 202/11/D
 - (20) J.C.S. 202/12/D
 - (21) J.C.S. 202/13/D
 - (22) J.C.S. 202/14/D
 - (23) J.C.S. 202/15/D
 - (24) J.C.S. 202/16/D
 - (25) J.C.S. 202/17/D
 - (26) J.C.S. 202/18/D
 - (27) J.C.S. 202/19/D
 - (28) J.C.S. 202/20/D
 - (29) J.C.S. 202/21/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT SECRETARIATNote by the Secretaries

The enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Secretariat as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th meeting. THIS CHARTER supersedes all charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

C. R. GRAFF,

P. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretaries.

RESTRICTED

c. When appropriate, inform the Joint Logistics Committee of proposed allocations.

d. Perform such other duties in relation to the allocation of munitions as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct.

e. Maintain information concerning munitions requirements and resources of the United States, as necessary for the effective functioning of the Committee.

6. The Joint Munitions Allocation Committee, shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Confer, when desirable, upon matters of munitions assignments which may be presented to the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington.

c. Seek strategic guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their appropriate agencies, and operate in accord therewith.

d. Implement its agreed decisions except upon matters of major policy.

e. Be assisted by the U.S. members of the Executive Staff of the Munitions Assignments Board.

f. Form subcommittees from personnel of the Army and Navy, as required, to assist it in the performance of its duties.

7. The Joint Munitions Allocation Committee if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

8. The Joint Munitions Allocation Committee is authorized to request all Service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in the performance of its duties and reciprocally will furnish information and assistance as appropriate, to such agencies.

ENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT MUNITIONS ALLOCATION COMMITTEE

The Joint Munitions Allocation Committee is hereby established. It is the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with the Joint Chiefs of Staff duties relating to the munitions allocated to the United States Forces in the Pacific and over-all logistic plans. This committee shall have U.S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, whose charter is hereby cancelled.

The Joint Munitions Allocation Committee will consist of: four general officers of the Army, one of whom shall be from the Army Air Forces.

and four officers of the Navy.

One of the above officers from each service shall be a member of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington.

If a member is unable to attend a meeting of the committee, or of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, he shall be represented by a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

The Joint Munitions Allocation Committee shall:

1. allocate munitions to United States forces in accordance with over-all logistic plans.

2. maintain close liaison with the Joint Logistics Committee in order that assignments and allocations of munition to U.S. forces may be in harmony with approved logistic plans.

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JCS 450

(1) JCS 450/B/D)

JOINT MUNITIONS

Page 45 - 49 Incl.

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|---------------|------------------|
| (1) JCS 450 | (7) JSSC 27/1 |
| (2) JFS 279/D | (8) JCS 450/4 |
| (3) JSSC 27 | (9) JAGC 74 |
| (4) JCS 450/1 | (10) JCS 450/5 |
| (5) JCS 450/2 | (11) JCS 450/6 |
| (6) JCS 450/3 | (12) JCS 450/7/2 |

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT MUNITIONS ALLOCATION COMMITTEEHeld by the Secretaries

The following is the CHARTER for the Joint Munitions
Allocation Committee.

F. B. ROYAL,
A. J. McFARLAND,
Joint Secretariat.

RESTRICTED

strategic policy, the changing operational conditions in their effect on war materials, and the realities of production.

g. When directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommend assignments to the United States armed forces of finished munitions under the cognizance of the Army or the Navy.

h. Perform such other duties in relation to the assignment of munitions as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct.

i. Excepting one Army representative and one Navy representative, serve as United States members of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington.

FUNCTIONS

3. The U.S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, shall:

a. Establish their own method of procedure.

b. Seek strategic guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Operate in accordance therewith.

d. Implement their agreed decisions except upon matters of major policy.

e. Be assisted by the U.S. members of the Executive Staff of the Munitions Assignments Board.

f. Form subcommittees from personnel of the Army and Navy, as required, to assist them in the performance of their duties.

g. Since complete agreement on all matters cannot be expected, the U.S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington,

if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then informed, may take appropriate action.

4. The U.S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, are authorized to request all agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with their duties.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERU. S. REPRESENTATIVES, MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD, WASHINGTONORGANIZATION

1. The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, (U.S. M.A.W.) are hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization charged with the performance for the Joint Chiefs of Staff of duties relating to the assignment of munitions and the balancing of resources against stated requirements.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, will consist of:

A. Not more than four general officers of the Army, one of whom will be from the Army Air Forces.

B. Not more than four officers of the Navy.

3. Whenever a member is unable to attend a meeting of the U. S. Representatives, or of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

4. The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, shall:

a. Maintain full information of the current munition requirements and resources of the United States.

b. Periodically inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the relation of production achievements and prospects to the munitions requirements of the armed forces of the United States and of other Allied or friendly nations, and to the through effective liaison with the military and civilian.

c. Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff measures to keep the planned requirements program in line with the

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 94149-28159(J.C.S. 202/20/D) (Revised)2 July 1953Pages 1 - 2 incl.

- (1) J.C.S. 202
- (2) J.C.S. 202/1/D
- (3) J.C.B. 58
- (4) J.I.C. 76/D
- (5) J.I.C. 76/1
- (6) J.P.S. 123
- (7) J.P.S. 123/1
- (8) J.C.S. 202/2
- (9) J.C.S. 202/3
- (10) J.C.S. 202/4
- (11) J.C.S. 202/5
- (12) J.C.S. 202/6
- (13) J.S.S.C. 13
- (14) J.C.S. 202/7
- (15) J.C.S. 202/8
- (16) J.C.S. 202/9
- (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
- (18) J.P.S. 180/D
- (19) J.C.S. 202/11/D
- (20) J.C.S. 202/12/D
- (21) J.C.S. 202/13/D
- (22) J.C.S. 202/14/D
- (23) J.C.S. 202/15/D
- (24) J.C.S. 202/16/D
- (25) J.C.S. 202/17/D
- (26) J.C.S. 202/18/D
- (27) J.C.S. 202/19/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERU. S. REPRESENTATIVES, MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD, WASHINGTONNote by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th Meeting. Subsequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by informal action, agreed that three of the four Army Representatives and three of the four Navy Representatives will serve as U.S. members of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington. Accordingly, paragraph 1.1 has been amended as shown on page 2.

J. P. DEANE,

P. B. RYAN,

Joint Secretaries.

ASSIGNED

strategic policy, the changing operational conditions in their effect on war materials, and the realities of production.

d. When directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommend assignments to the United States armed forces of finished munitions under the cognizance of the Army or the Navy.

e. Perform such other duties in relation to the assignment of munitions as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct.

f. Serve as United States members of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington.

FUNCTIONS

1. The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, shall:

a. Establish their own method of procedure.

b. Seek strategic guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and operate in accordance therewith.

c. Implement their agreed decisions except upon matters of major policy.

d. Be assisted by the U. S. members of the Executive Staff of the Munitions Assignments Board.

e. Form subcommittees from personnel of the Army and Navy, as required, to assist them in the performance of their duties.

f. Since complete agreement on all matters cannot be expected.

The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree. It is noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

2. The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, are authorized to request all Service and Government agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with their duties.

ENCLOSURECHARTERU. S. REPRESENTATIVES, MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD, WASHINGTONORGANIZATION

1. The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, (U.S. M.A.B.W.) are hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization charged with the performance for the Joint Chiefs of Staff of duties relating to the assignment of munitions and the balancing of resources against stated requirements.

COMPOSITION

2. The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, will consist of:

- a. Not more than four general officers of the Army, one of whom will be from the Army Air Forces.
- b. Not more than four officers of the Navy.

3. Whenever a member is unable to attend a meeting of the U. S. Representatives, or of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

4. The U. S. Representatives, Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, shall:

a. Maintain full information of the entire munition requirements and resources of the United States.

b. Periodically inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the relation of production achievement and prospects to the munitions requirements of the armed forces of the United States and of other Allied or friendly nations, and coordinate through effective liaison with the supply authorities.

c. Recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff measures to be taken to meet the planned requirements for munitions.

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(J.C.S. 202/20/D)

May 11, 1943Pages 1 - 2 incl.

- (1) J.C.S. 202
- (2) J.C.S. 202/1/D
- (3) J.C.B. 58
- (4) J.I.C. 16/D
- (5) J.I.C. 76/1
- (6) J.P.S. 123
- (7) J.P.S. 123/1
- (8) J.C.S. 202/2
- (9) J.C.S. 202/3
- (10) J.C.S. 202/4
- (11) J.C.S. 202/5
- (12) J.C.S. 202/6
- (13) J.S.S.C. 13
- (14) J.C.S. 202/7
- (15) J.C.S. 202/8
- (16) J.C.S. 202/9
- (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
- (18) J.P.S. 180/D
- (19) J.C.S. 202/11/D
- (20) J.C.S. 202/12/D
- (21) J.C.S. 202/13/D
- (22) J.C.S. 202/14/D
- (23) J.C.S. 202/15/D
- (24) J.C.S. 202/16/D
- (25) J.C.S. 202/17/D
- (26) J.C.S. 202/18/D
- (27) J.C.S. 202/19/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERU. S. REPRESENTATIVE3, MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD, WASHINGTONNote by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the U. S. Representative,
Munitions Assignments Board, Washington as approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in their 79th Meeting.

J. R. FRANK,

S. B. CYAL,

Joint Secy. Sec.

PROCESSES

5. The Joint Meteorological Committee shall:

- a. Establish its own method of procedure.
- b. Implement its agreed decisions except upon matters of major policy which will require the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- c. Form subcommittees from personnel of the Army, the Navy, and the U.S. Weather Bureau, as required, to assist it in the performance of its duties.
- d. Effect complete coordination with the Joint Communications Board with regard to joint meteorological communications and the security thereof.

6. Since complete agreement on all matters can not be expected, the Joint Meteorological Committee, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

7. The Joint Meteorological Committee is authorized to request all Service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance as may be required in connection with their duties.

~~RESTRICTED~~ENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEEORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Meteorological Committee (J.M.C.) is hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization with cognizance of meteorological matters.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Meteorological Committee will consist of:

- a. A representative of the U. S. Department of Commerce (U.S. Weather Bureau).
- b. A representative of the U. S. Army (U.S. Army Air Forces).
- c. A representative of the U.S. Navy.

3. Whenever a member of the Joint Meteorological Committee is unable to attend a meeting, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

4. The Joint Meteorological Committee shall:

- a. Take such action as may be necessary to coordinate basic methods and procedures, operations, equipment (including the coordination of research, development, and allocation to meet operational needs), and all other meteorological matters of joint application.

5. The members of the Joint Meteorological Committee shall be the United States members of the Combined Meteorological Committee.

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- (1) JCS 202
- (2) JCS 202/L/D
- (3) JCS 58
- (4) JIC 76/D
- (5) JIC 76/1
- (6) JPS 123
- (7) JPS 123/1
- (8) JCS 202/2
- (9) JCS 202/3
- (10) JCS 202/4
- (11) JCS 202/5
- (12) JCS 202/6
- (13) JSSC 13
- (14) JCS 202/7
- (15) JCS 202/8
- (16) JCS 202/9
- (17) JCS 202/10/D
- (18) JPS 180/D
- (19) JCS 202/11/D
- (20) JCS 202/12/D
- (21) JCS 202/13/D
- (22) JCS 202/14/D
- (23) JCS 202/15/D
- (24) JCS 202/16/D
- (25) JCS 202/17/D
- (26) JCS 202/18/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEENote by the Secretaries

This Committee is the CHARTER for the Joint Meteorological Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 70th meeting. This CHARTER supersedes all charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. H. DEANE

B. D. ROYAL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

RESTRICTED

d. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appropriate agencies in the Army and Navy of progress being made in the development of new weapons and equipment, and recommend appropriate action in connection therewith.

e. Maintain liaison with agencies of other United Nations engaged in the development of new weapons and equipment.

PROCEDURE

5. The Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Encourage direct dealing among the various research agencies and the heads of the divisions concerned with research or development of the Army Air Forces, the Ground Forces, and the Services of Supply, and the corresponding naval services.

6. Since complete agreement on all matters can not be expected, the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

7. The Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment is authorized to request all Service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENTORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment (J.N.W.) is hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization charged with facilitating research and development of new weapons and equipment.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment will consist of:

a. The Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development.

b. One general officer of the Army.

c. One flag officer of the Navy.

3. Whenever a member of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment is unable to attend a meeting, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

4. The Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment shall:

A. Coordinate the work of Service agencies with other governmental agencies concerned with research and development of new weapons and equipment.

B. Determine, through consideration of strategic plan, where emphasis in research should be placed.

C. Advise appropriate non-military research agencies of the requirements of the armed services for new weapons and equipment, and assist them in adapting new scientific progress to the requirements of the armed services.

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(J.C.S. 202/18/D)

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- (1) J.C.S. 202
- (2) J.C.S. 202/1/D
- (3) J.C.B. 58
- (4) J.I.C. 76/D
- (5) J.I.C. 76/1
- (6) J.P.S. 123
- (7) J.P.S. 123/1
- (8) J.C.S. 202/2
- (9) J.C.S. 202/3
- (10) J.C.S. 202/4
- (11) J.C.S. 202/5
- (12) J.C.S. 202/6
- (13) J.S.S.C. 13
- (14) J.C.S. 202/7
- (15) J.C.S. 202/8
- (16) J.C.S. 202/9
- (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
- (18) J.P.S. 180/D
- (19) J.C.S. 202/11/D
- (20) J.C.S. 202/12/D
- (21) J.C.S. 202/13/D
- (22) J.C.S. 202/14/D
- (23) J.C.S. 202/15/D
- (24) J.C.S. 202/16/D
- (25) J.C.S. 202/17/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENTNote by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 19th Meeting. This CHARTER supersedes all charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

P. B. FOTEL,

Joint Secretariat.

RESTRICTEDPROCEDURE

6. The Joint Communications Board shall:

- a. Establish its own method of procedure.
- b. Implement its agreed decisions except on matters of major policy.
- c. Form subcommittees from personnel of the Army and the Navy as required to assist it in the performance of its duties. The members of permanent subcommittees will constitute the U.S. membership on the committees and subcommittees of the Combined Communications Board.

7. The Joint Communications Board will appoint an executive officer of the Board and prescribe his duties.

8. Since complete agreement on all matters can not be expected, the Joint Communications Board, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the member disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

9. The Joint Communications Board is authorized to request all Service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance as may be required in connection with its duties.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT COMMUNICATIONS BOARDORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Communications Board (J.C.B.) is hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization with cognizance of communications matters.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Communications Board shall consist of:

- a. The Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army.
- b. The Communication Officer, U.S. Army Air Forces.
- c. The Director, Naval Communications.
- d. The Communication Officer, Headquarters, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

3. Whenever a member of the Joint Communications Board is unable to attend a meeting, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

4. The Joint Communications Board shall:

- a. Make recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to United States communications policies.
- b. Coordinate methods, procedures, operations, equipment (including recommendations for the coordination of research, development, and allocation to meet operational needs), and all communications matters of joint U.S. application.

5. The members of the Joint Communications Board shall serve as the United States members of the Combined Communications Board.

15-25
(JCS 202/17/D)

May 19, 1942

Pages 1-3 Incl.

- (1) JCS 202
- (2) JCS 202/1/D
- (3) JCB 58
- (4) JIC 76/D
- (5) JIC 76/1
- (6) JPS 123
- (7) JPS 123/1
- (8) JCS 202/2
- (9) JCS 202/3
- (10) JCS 202/4
- (11) JCS 202/5
- (12) JCS 202/6
- (13) JSSC 13
- (14) JCS 202/7
- (15) JCS 202/8
- (16) JCS 202/9
- (17) JCS 202/10/D
- (18) JPS 180/D
- (19) JCS 202/11/D
- (20) JCS 202/12/D
- (21) JCS 202/13/D
- (22) JCS 202/14/D
- (23) JCS 202/15/D
- (24) JCS 202/16/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CHARTER

JOINT COMMUNICATIONS BOARD

Adopted by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Communications Board as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th meeting. This CHARTER supersedes all charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

P. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

JCB

RESTRICTED

8. When it becomes evident that the allocations from the War Shipping Administration will not provide sufficient shipping to meet urgent Military requirements, report the implications of the shortage to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and make appropriate recommendations with regard thereto.

9. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to recommendations which should be made to the Maritime Commission in order to coordinate the over-all merchant shipbuilding program with Military requirements.

5. The members of the Joint Military Transportation Committee shall serve as the United States members of the Combined Military Transportation Committee.

PROCEDURE

6. The Joint Military Transportation Committee shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Implement its agreed decisions except on matters of major policy.

c. Form subcommittees from personnel of the Army and Navy, as required, to assist it in the performance of its duties.

7. Since complete agreement on all matters can not be expected, the Joint Military Transportation Committee, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

8. The Joint Military Transportation Committee is authorized to request all Service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties.

~~RESTRICTED~~ENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEEORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Military Transportation Committee (J.M.T.C.) is hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization with cognizance of military overseas transportation.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Military Transportation Committee will consist of:

- a. Two general officers of the Army.
- b. Two officers of the Navy.
- c. A representative of the War Shipping Administration will be invited to attend meetings of the Committee as an associate member.

3. Whenever a member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee is unable to attend a meeting, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

- 4. The Joint Military Transportation Committee shall:
 - a. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to shipping and all matters involving military overseas transportation.
 - b. Coordinate the overseas transportation facilities of the Army and Navy with those of the War Shipping Administration and the United Nations for the movement overseas of personnel and war materials.
 - c. Keep the War Shipping Administration informed of the overall military and naval requirements for overseas transportation.
 - d. Apportion the shipping allocated by the War Shipping Administration to meet requirements of the Army and Navy in accordance with existing priorities.

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(J.C.S. 202/16/D)May 11, 1947Pages 1 - 2 incl.

- (1) J.C.S. 202
- (2) J.C.S. 202/1/D
- (3) J.C.B. 58
- (4) J.I.C. 76/D
- (5) J.I.C. 76/1
- (6) J.P.S. 123
- (7) J.P.S. 123/1
- (8) J.C.S. 202/2
- (9) J.C.S. 202/3
- (10) J.C.S. 202/4
- (11) J.C.S. 202/5
- (12) J.C.S. 20 /6
- (13) J.S.S.C. 13
- (14) J.C.S. 202/7
- (15) J.C.S. 202/8
- (16) J.C.S. 202/9
- (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
- (18) J.P.S. 180/D
- (19) J.C.S. 202/11/D
- (20) J.C.S. 202/12/D
- (21) J.C.S. 202/13/D
- (22) J.C.S. 202/14/D
- (23) J.C.S. 202/15/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEENote by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Military Transportation Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th Meeting.

J. R. DEANE,

P. B. PCYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

JMC

SECRET

1. Coordinate the overseas transportation facilities of the Army and Navy with those of the War Shipping Administration and the United Nations for the movement overseas of personnel and war materials.

2. Keep the War Shipping Administration informed of the requirements for military overseas transportation, based on approved overall logistic plans.

3. Apportion the shipping allocated by the War Shipping Administration to meet requirements of the Army and Navy in accordance with existing priorities.

4. The members of the Joint Military Transportation Committee shall serve as the United States members of the Combined Military Transportation Committee.

ARTICLE II

5. The Joint Military Transportation Committee shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Implement its agreed decisions except on matters of major policy.

c. Form subcommittees from personnel of the Army and Navy, as required, to assist it in the performance of its duties.

d. Seek guidance on strategic plans from the Joint Staff Planners and on overall logistic plans from the Joint Logistics Committee.

6. The Joint Military Transportation Committee, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

7. The Joint Military Transportation Committee is authorized to request all Services and Governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties, and reciprocally will furnish information and assistance as appropriate to such agencies.

ENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEEARTICLE I

The Joint Military Transportation Committee (J.M.T.C.) is established as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for performing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for the several agencies thereof duties relating to military over-seas transportation.

ARTICLE II

The Joint Military Transportation Committee will consist of:

- a. The General officers of the Army.
- b. The officers of the Navy.
- c. The representative of the War Shipping Administration will be invited to attend meetings of the Committee as an associate member.
- d. Whenever a member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee is unable to attend a meeting, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

ARTICLE III

The Joint Military Transportation Committee shall:

- a. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to administrative and operational matters concerning military overseas transportation.
- b. Furnish information and advice concerning military overseas transportation, to the Joint Logistics Committee, as may be necessary to assist that Committee to perform its function of overall logistic planning.

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 8210-2(J.C.S. 102/27/D)11 October 1943Page 1 of 2 incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

Reference: 118th Meeting, Item 2

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a revised CHARTER for the Joint Military Transportation Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 118th Meeting. This CHARTER supersedes J.C.S.

F.B.R./D.

F. B. ROYAL,

A. J. McFARLAND,

Joint Secretariat.

RESTRICTED

2. Publish intelligence summaries as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. The members of the Joint Intelligence Committee shall serve as United States members of the Combined Intelligence Committee.

FUNCTIONS

7. The Joint Intelligence Committee shall:

1. Establish its own methods of procedure.
2. Maintain close liaison with the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint War Plans Committee in order to make readily available its services in connection with the preparation of studies and war plans.

8. The Joint Intelligence Committee will be assisted by a permanent joint intelligence staff consisting of members detailed from the respective organizations of the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, functioning as a committee under the chairmanship of the senior Army or Navy member.

9. Since complete agreement on all matters can not be expected, the Joint Intelligence Committee, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

10. The Joint Intelligence Committee is authorized to establish, with the cooperation of interested departments of the Government, subcommittees of experts on subjects of continuing special interest.

11. The Joint Intelligence Committee is authorized to request all service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEEORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.) is hereby established as the intelligence agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Intelligence Committee will consist of:

- a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.
 - b. The Director of Naval Intelligence.
 - c. The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Army Air Forces.
 - d. A representative of the Secretary of State.
 - e. A representative of the Chairman, Board of Economic Warfare.
 - f. A representative of the Director of Strategic Services.
3. The senior Army or Navy member will be the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

4. Whenever a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee is unable to attend a meeting, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

5. The Joint Intelligence Committee shall:

- a. Furnish intelligence for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization.
- b. Make written reports or oral presentations as requested.

COPY NO. 97159RESTRICTED159-21
(JCS 202/15/D)May 10, 1947Pages 1-2 incl.

- (1) JCS 202
- (2) JCS 202/1/D
- (3) JCB 58
- (4) JIC 76/D
- (5) JIC 76/1
- (6) JPS 123
- (7) JPS 123/1
- (8) JCS 202/2
- (9) JCS 202/3
- (10) JCS 202/4
- (11) JCS 202/5
- (12) JCS 202/6
- (13) JSSC 13
- (14) JCS 202/7
- (15) JCS 202/8
- (16) JCS 202/9
- (17) JCS 202/10/D
- (18) JPS 180/D
- (19) JCS 202/11/D
- (20) JCS 202/12/D
- (21) JCS 202/13/D
- (22) JCS 202/14/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEENoted by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Intelligence Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their deliberations. This CHARTER supersedes all charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEAN,

P. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

C1F

RESTRICTED

Other joint planning teams, as required.

FUNCTIONS

4. The planning teams of the Joint War Plans Committee shall:
 - a. Prepare war plans, studies, and estimates as directed by the Joint Staff Planners.
 - b. Submit completed war plans, studies, and estimates to the Joint Staff Planners.

PROCESSES

5. The planning teams of the Joint War Plans Committee shall:
 - a. Establish their own method of procedure.
 - b. Enter upon all deliberations with instructions from no source other than the Joint Staff Planners jointly. In their deliberations they will present their individual views regardless of rank or service, and will endeavor to reach composite solutions.
 - c. Meet with the Joint Staff Planners at frequent intervals for the purpose of presenting their views, seeking advice, and requesting decisions from the Joint Staff Planners relating to war plans or studies under preparation.
 - d. Employ the services of the Joint Intelligence Committee in connection with the preparation of war plans and studies, and in estimating the capabilities of the enemy.
6. The Joint War Plans Committee is authorized to request all service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEEORGANIZATION

1. The Joint War Plans Committee (J.W.P.C.) is hereby established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a working committee of the Joint Staff Planners.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint War Plans Committee will consist of designated members of the planning sections of:

a. The Chief, Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

b. The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, Plans, U. S. Army Air Forces.

c. The Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans), Headquarters, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

d. Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

3. From the personnel of the Joint War Plans Committee there will be organized:

a. A planning team consisting of four officers of the Army, including two officers of the Army Air Forces, and four officers of the Navy, including an officer of the Marine Corps. This group will be permanently quartered together. The Joint Staff Planners may alter the number of members of this group if the requirements of war planning make such action desirable. Members of the group shall be assigned no other duty within their respective service, nor shall they be required to serve as members of other agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They shall, however, act as subcommittees and appointed by the Joint Staff Planners.

COPY NO. 97159159-22

(J.C.S. 202/14/D)

May 11, 1942Pages 1 - 2 incl.

- (1) J.C.S. 202
- (2) J.C.S. 202/1/D
- (3) J.C.B. 58
- (4) J.I.C. 76/D
- (5) J.I.C. 76/1
- (6) J.P.S. 123
- (7) J.P.S. 123/1
- (8) J.C.S. 202/2
- (9) J.C.S. 202/3
- (10) J.C.S. 202/4
- (11) J.C.S. 202/5
- (12) J.C.S. 202/6
- (13) J.S.S.C. 13
- (14) J.C.S. 202/7
- (15) J.C.S. 202/8
- (16) J.C.S. 202/9
- (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
- (18) J.P.S. 180/D
- (19) J.C.S. 202/11/D
- (20) J.C.S. 202/12/D
- (21) J.C.S. 202/13/D

JWPC

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEENote by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint War Plans Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th Meeting. This Charter supercedes all charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee.

J. P. LESTER

F. B. RYAN

Joint Secretaries

RESTRICTED

d. Furnish guidance and information concerning matters under its consideration to agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization and to agencies of the War and Navy Departments whose participation is required in the preparation of studies and plans or the execution of plans.

e. Represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff in combined considerations of matters under their jurisdiction.

PROCEDURE

5. The Joint Administrative Committee shall:

- a. Establish its own method of procedure.
- b. Form subcommittees from personnel of the Army and Navy, as required, to assist it in the performance of its duties.
- c. Consult and inform the Joint Staff Planners, formally or informally, in order to insure that matters under its cognizance are handled in accordance with joint war plans or joint operations.

6. Since complete agreement on all matters cannot be expected, the Joint Administrative Committee, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

7. The Joint Administrative Committee is authorized to request all service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with its duties.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEEORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Administrative Committee (J.A.C) is hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization charged with the duty of handling matters coming under the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which do not come under the jurisdiction of one of the other agencies in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Administrative Committee will consist of:

a. Two general officers of the Army one of whom will be from the Army Air Forces.

b. Two officers of the Navy.

3. Whenever a member of the Joint Administrative Committee is unable to attend a meeting of the Joint Administrative Committee or the Combined Staff Planners, he will be represented by a representative who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

4. The Joint Administrative Committee shall:

a. Study and make recommendations on matters referred to it by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Advise for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and advise them in regard to action to be taken on recommendations of other agencies referred to it by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. In coordination with the Joint Staff Planners, representatives of the Joint Staff Planners may be invited to attend meetings of the Joint Administrative Committee.

COPY NO. 98RESTRICTED151-17J.C.S. 202/10/11PL 5, 1952159

- (1) JCS 202
- (2) JCS 202/1/D
- (3) JCB 58
- (4) JIC 76/D
- (5) JIC 76/1
- (6) JPS 123
- (7) JPS 123/1
- (8) JCS 202/2
- (9) JCS 202/3
- (10) JCS 202/4
- (11) JCS 202/5
- (12) JCS 202/6
- (13) JSSC 13
- (14) JCS 202/7
- (15) JCS 202/8
- (16) JCS 202/9

JADC

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHAPTERJOINT ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEENote by the Secretaries

The enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Administrative Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 77th meeting.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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d. Review all studies and war plans prepared by the planning teams of the Joint War Plans Committee and, when appropriate, submit them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. Employ the services of the Joint Intelligence Committee in connection with the preparation of studies and war plans, and in estimating the capabilities of the enemy.

6. Since complete agreement on all matters can not be expected, the Joint Staff Planners, if unable to reach agreement promptly, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thus informed, can take appropriate action.

7. The Joint Staff Planners are authorized to request all Service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with their duties.

JOINT STAFF

projected Military operations, and make recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to final approval.

d. Review security measures submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Joint Security Control.

e. Review for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and advise them in regard to action to be taken on recommendations of other agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization when such recommendations concern joint war plans or joint operations.

f. Furnish strategic guidance and information concerning joint war plans to, and act in coordination with, the Joint Administrative Committee. Representatives of the Joint Administrative Committee may be invited to attend the meetings of the Joint Staff Planners.

g. Furnish strategic guidance and information concerning joint war plans to agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization and to agencies of the War and Navy Departments when participation is required in the preparation of studies and war plans or the execution of war plans.

h. Represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Combined Staff Planners for matters under their jurisdiction.

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

1. The Joint Staff Planners shall:

a. Establish their own method of procedure.

b. Issue directives to the planning teams of the Joint War Plans Committee prescribing the studies and war plans to be prepared, and setting forth the factors controlling the scope of each study or war plan.

c. Meet with the planning teams of the Joint War Plans Committee at frequent intervals for the purpose of discussing, giving advice, and rendering decisions relative to the studies or war plans under preparation.

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(J.C.S. 202/13/D)

MAY 11, 1943

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- (1) JCS 202
- (2) JCS 202/1/D
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- (4) JIC 76/D
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- (6) JPS 123
- (7) JPS 123/1
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- (9) JCS 202/3
- (10) JCS 202/4
- (11) JCS 202/5
- (12) JCS 202/6
- (13) JSSC 13
- (14) JCS 202/7
- (15) JCS 202/8
- (16) JCS 202/9
- (17) JCS 202/10/D
- (18) JPS 180/D
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- (20) JCS 202/12/D

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT STAFF PLANNERSNote by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Staff Planners
as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th meeting.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

EXCLUDED

5. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee shall:

- a. Establish its own method of procedure.
- b. Present its conclusions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as written memoranda, or orally if so requested.

6. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee is authorized to request all agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization and of the War and Navy Departments for such information, studies, or estimates as it may require in connection with its duties.

7. The members of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee are authorized to attend such meetings of the Joint and Combined Staff Planners and of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff as they may desire.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEEORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (J.S.S.C.) is hereby established as the agency in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization charged with advising the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of grand and Military strategy.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee will consist of:

a. Two General officers of the Army, one of whom will be from the Army Air Forces.

b. Not more than two flag officers of the Navy.

3. The members of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee will not be regularly assigned to other duties.

FUNCTIONS

4. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee shall:

a. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to strategy, and the relation of Military strategy to national policy.

b. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to combined Military strategy in the light of the developing and predictable situation, and in the light of long-range possibilities.

c. Advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic possibilities to be considered when current plans have either been executed or become impracticable.

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 97159-20(J.C.S. 202/12/D)May 10, 1943Pages 1 - 2, incl.159

- (1) J.C.S. 202
- (2) J.C.S. 202/1/D
- (3) J.C.B. 58
- (4) J.I.C. 75/D
- (5) J.I.C. 75/1
- (6) J.P.S. 123
- (7) J.P.S. 123/1
- (8) J.C.S. 202/2
- (9) J.C.S. 202/3
- (10) J.C.S. 202/4
- (11) J.C.S. 202/5
- (12) J.C.S. 202/6
- (13) J.S.S.C. 13
- (14) J.C.S. 202/7
- (15) J.C.S. 202/8
- (16) J.C.S. 202/9
- (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
- (18) J.P.S. 180/D
- (19) J.C.S. 202/1./D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEENote by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Strategic Survey Committee as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th Meeting. This CHARTER supersedes all charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

~~RESTRICTED~~ENCLOSURECHARTERJOINT DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFFORGANIZATION

1. The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff (J.D.C.S.) are hereby established as an executive agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff will consist of:

- a. The Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
- b. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

FUNCTIONS

3. The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff shall:

- a. Interpret and implement the known policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Act on matters requiring decision that are referred to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PROCEDURE

4. The deliberations of the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff may be accomplished formally at regular meetings, or members may communicate their respective decisions by informal notification to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. In taking final action on any matter referred to them, members of the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff must be in unanimous agreement in their decision, both as to the decision which is made and also that further review of such decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is unnecessary. If either of these conditions does not obtain, the matter in question shall be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through their Secretariat, with appropriate recommendations.

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 98159-19159

(J.C.S. 202/11/D)

May 10, 1943Page 1

- (1) J.C.S. 202
- (2) J.C.S. 202/1/D
- (3) J.C.B. 58
- (4) J.I.C. 76/D
- (5) J.I.C. 76/1
- (6) J.P.S. 123
- (7) J.P.S. 123/1
- (8) J.C.S. 202/2
- (9) J.C.S. 202/3
- (10) J.C.S. 202/4
- (11) J.C.S. 202/5
- (12) J.C.S. 202/6
- (13) J.S.S.C. 13
- (14) J.C.S. 202/7
- (15) J.C.S. 202/8
- (16) J.C.S. 202/9
- (17) J.C.S. 202/10/D
- (18) J.P.S. 180/D

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFCHARTERJOINT DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFFNote by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the CHARTER for the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 79th Meeting. This CHARTER supersedes all Charters and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

P. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

CHARTERS OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEES
AND AGENCIES

RESTRICTED

COPY NO. 100

369-5
(J.C.S. 318/4)

29 May 1945

Page 8

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- (1) JCS 318
- (2) JCS 318/1
- (3) JCS 318/2
- (4) JCS 318/3

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFGENERAL POLICIES FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATIONMemorandum by the Secretaries

All supporting agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are informed that the recommendations contained in J.C.S. 318/2 were this date approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

24 May 1960

JOINT

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY

Subject: Case
Org

Reference: (a)

1. It is desired that
for the next meeting of
available for distribution

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of all data pertinent to a particular problem the members of a committee cannot agree, they will submit an immediate report indicating their divergent views. Reports of committees will be limited to two typewritten pages, double space, with discussion and other supporting data attached as enclosures, appendices, and annexes.

4. Relations with British members of Combined Committees

Problems of combined interest must be approached and solved in accordance with the above policies. The governing consideration should be the successful prosecution of the war.

RESTRICTEDENCLOSUREGENERAL POLICIES GOVERNING
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

Following are policies of general nature which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish their supporting agencies to follow:

1. Non-partisanship

Officers on duty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization are drawn from the several services to assist in integrating the capabilities, functions, and needs of their particular service to the problems presented this organization. Their effort should be to reach sound solutions to all problems presented by the most effective employment of the joint means at hand. As Staff Officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is their duty to reach decisions which will best prosecute the war after due consideration has been given to the views of the agencies of the War and Navy Departments interested in the matters under consideration.

2. Committee members not to be instructed

Committees are required to make solutions of the problems presented after full consideration of all pertinent factors. They should approach all problems with open minds and without firm preconceived decisions based on consideration of partial information only. Deliberations and not negotiations are required. Deliberations cannot ensue if committee members are hampered by instructions or the answers to problems from which they are not permitted to depart.

3. Speed and brevity

Every effort will be made to expedite the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. To this end subcommittees will be set up promptly to consider views without waiting for a formal meeting of the parent committee. If after a full consideration

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169-1

(J.C.S. 318/3)

(1) JCS 318
(2) JCS 318/1
(3) JCS 318/2

28 May 1943

Pages 5-6 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

GENERAL POLICIES FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
is circulated for information.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat

369

369-7
(J.C.S. 318/2)

(1) J.C.S. 318
(2) J.C.S. 318/1

28 May 1943

Page 1

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

GENERAL POLICIES FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

Memorandum by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PROBLEM

To expedite the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

The work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is being retarded by the current practice of supporting committees of holding papers requiring action until the next fixed weekly meeting. Delays incident to this practice may occur several times during the processing of a single paper.

These delays are prolonged when a supporting committee refers a paper received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to some other supporting committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the practice of supporting committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting only on a specified day each week be discontinued.

That the chairman of each supporting committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff call meetings of his committee as often as the number and nature of the papers awaiting action requires.

That when a committee considers that a paper should be more appropriately handled by another supporting committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it should return the paper to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a notation to that effect.

That when a committee desires information from another committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it will obtain the needed information by informal request to the other committee and not by resending the entire paper to it.

GENERAL POLICIES FOR
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

RESTRICTEDJoint Secretariat (Cont'd)

1st Lt. R. C. Loehr
1st Lt. H. M. Wilson
1st Lt. Elkan Henly, Jr.
1st Lt. Luis Galvan
Ens. D. A. Hegarty
Ens. G. Hopkins
Ens. W. J. Phelps
Ens. Wm. M. Hunter
Ens. W. E. Martin
Ens. Elizabeth Frosser
Ens. Wm. Y. Wilkins, Jr.
Ens. D. Powell
2nd Lt. Cecelia Winkler
2nd Lt. Rupert M. Cassell
(Several of the officers
listed above have only
part time duties with
the Secretariat.)

RESTRICTEDTHE COMBINED SECRETARIATBritish Joint Secretariat

Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones - Secretary
 Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN - Deputy Secretary
 Group Captain T.E.H. Birley
 Major J. A. Davison
 Major C. W. Garnett
 Major A. H. Bishop
 Lt. Colonel R.S.S. Allen
 Instr. Cdr. P. Bracelin, RN

Communications Secretariat

Commander B. P. Charles, RNVR
 Major A. G. David
 Major A. J. Gishford
 P/Lt. L. A. Furness, RAF

Joint Secretariat

Brig. General A. J. McFarland - Secretary
 Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN
 Deputy Secretary
 Colonel C. R. Peck - Executive Secretary
 Colonel Don F. Lowry - Supply Secretary
 Colonel F. W. Wozencraft - Asst. Secy, Communications
 Colonel G. G. Epley - Assistant Executive Secy.
 Lt. Colonel W. W. Chapman, Jr. - Asst. Deputy Secretary
 Colonel C. J. Gridley
 Colonel Edwin Cox
 Colonel Erle F. Cross
 Colonel F. R. Sweeney
 Colonel Forrest B. Volkel
 Colonel C. H. Donnolly
 Colonel E. C. Kielkopf
 Captain G. B. Myers, USN
 Captain R. U. Hyde, USN
 Lt. Colonel R. B. Pegram, Jr.
 Lt. Colonel David Mackay
 Lt. Colonel Gordon Dorrance
 Lt. Colonel James S. Lay
 Lt. Colonel C. Bowie Millison
 Commander Perry R. Taylor
 Lt. Comdr. F. J. Green
 Lt. Comdr. H. L. Vanderford
 Lt. Comdr. Allison Dunham
 Major Warde M. Cameron
 Major D.M.S. Langworthy
 Major Duncan C. Lee
 Major J. T. Hillis
 Major L. B. Klemann
 Lieut. H. C. Johnson, Jr., USNR
 Lieut. W. E. Stockhausen, USNR
 Lieut. E. B. Bridgman, USNR
 Lieut. J. V. Bassett, USNR
 Lieut. D. M. Gribbon, USNR
 Lieut. Roy B. Snapp, USNR
 Lieut. H. F. Schenk, USNR
 Lieut. H. P. Wright, USNR
 Captain G. C. Biddle
 Captain E. C. Boyden
 Captain Joe Weber
 Captain C. C. Gooden
 Captain J. C. Roth
 Captain C. M. Jones
 Captain B. F. Coffin
 Captain C. T. Conner
 Lt. (JG) John K. M. Tibby, Jr.
 Lt. (JG) H. V. Wright
 Lt. (JG) David L. Graham
 Lt. (JG) J. P. Zillman
 Lt. (JG) Frank W. Harrison
 Lt. (JG) Mary E. McLaughlin
 Lt. (JG) G. Pomeroy

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 Admiral William H. Standley
 Vice Admiral William T. Tarrant
 Major General John P. Smith
 Mr. Robert Woods Bliss (State)
 Mr. Shepard Morgan (OSS)
 Mr. Whitney Shepardson (OSS)

Executive Officer Colonel A. H. Onthank

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL

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 Major General Clayton Bissell
 Captain John M. Creighton, USN
 Colonel James K. Cockrell
 Colonel Woodbury M. Burgess
 Colonel George W. Cutting
 Colonel Newman Smith
 Lt. Colonel C. E. Goldbranson
 Lt. Comdr. Harold Burris-Meyer
 Lt. Comdr. Robert F. Nelson
 Major John C. Grillo

Secy. - Colonel Forrest B. Volkel
 Asst. Secy. - Lt. W. E. Stockhausen, USNR

COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEEBritish Members

Sir Ronald Campbell -
 Embassy Rep.
 Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready -
 J.S.M. Rep.
 Hon. R. H. Brand -
 Civ. Rep. - Financial
 Mr. A. D. Harris - Civ. Rep. -
 Economic

Secretary -
 Group Capt. T.E.H. Birley

U.S. Members

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 Mr. Jas. C. Dunn - Stat
 Department
 Major General J.H. Hildner -
 War Department Rep.
 Captain C. B. Colclough,
 USN - Navy Department
 Rep.

Secretary -
 Major General M. G. ...
 Asst. Secy. - Capt. ...
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Major General G. ...
 Rear Admiral H. ...
 Colonel C. J. ...
 Captain P. ...
 Colonel M. ...

Executive Officer ...
 Secy. - Captain ...
 Asst. Secy. - Lt. ...

COMBINED MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEEBritish Joint Military Transportation Committee

Major General A. W. Lee
Brigadier E. Seymour-Bell
Colonel W. B. N. Roderick
Captain H. W. Morey
Group Captain R. O. Rhys

Associate Member -
Hon. J. S. Maclay (B.M.S.M.)

Secy. - Lt. Col. R.S.S. Allen

Joint Military Transportation Committee

Lt. General R. B. Smyth
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith
Major General C. P. Gross
Lt. Comdr. T. H. Ross

Associate Member -
Mr. Granville Curzon (W.S.A.)

Secy. - Lt. (JG) J. L. Killen

JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Dr. V. Bush (Office of Scientific
Research and Development)

Rear Admiral V. S. Delany
Brig. General Grandison Gardner
Brig. General William A. Borden
Secretary - Colonel Edwin Cox

COMBINED METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEECommonwealth Joint Meteorological Committee

Mr. C.W.G. Daking -UK
Instr. Comdr. T. Bracelin, RN -UK
Dr. J. Patterson -Can.
Grp. Capt. F.W. Thomas RAAF -Aus.
Wing Comdr. H. A. Robinson, RCAF (Alt.) -Can.
A/Cdre. J.L. Findlay, RNEAF -NZ
Brigadier J. Holthouse -S.Af.

Secy. - Instr. Comdr.
P. Bracelin, RN

Joint Meteorological Committee

Colonel H. H. Barnett
Captain H. T. Orville, USN
Dr. F. W. Redfield (Chief, U.S. Weather Bureau)

Secy. - Lt. J.V. Planchet, USN

ARMY-NAVY PETROLEUM BOARD

Lt. General C. B. Smyth
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith
Brig. General C. M. Gross

Executive Officer -
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith
Asst. Executive Officer -
Brig. General C. M. Gross
Secy. - Lt. J.V. Planchet, USN
Lt. Col. R.S.S. Allen

Director - Brig. General C. M. Gross
First Asst. Dir. - Mr. H. J. Smith
Secy. - Lt. J.V. Planchet, USN
Asst. Secy. - Lt. Col. R.S.S. Allen
Brig. General C. M. Gross
Lt. Col. R.S.S. Allen
Lt. J.V. Planchet, USN
Lt. Col. R.S.S. Allen

Secretary

RESTRICTEDCOMBINED COMMUNICATIONS BOARDCommonwealth Joint Communications Committee

Brigadier A. C. Sykes -UK
 Alt: Col. J. B. Adams -UK
 Air Commodore A. F. Lang -UK
 Alt: G/C A. G. Powell -UK
 Capt. K. McN. Walter -UK
 Lt. Comdr. J. A. Jarvis -Can.
 Alt: Lt. Col. H.D.W. Nethey -Can.
 Commander A. S. Rosenthal -Aus.
 Alt: Col. R. Kendall -Aus.
 Commander B. T. Giles -RNZNVR
 Alt: S/Ldr. A.W. Stockwell -RNZAF
 Chairman - Capt. P.F. Glover -RN
 Secy. - Cdr. B.P. Charles -RNVR

Joint Communications Board

Rear Admiral Jos. R. Reaman -
 Chairman.
 Alt: Captain J.V. Murphy, USN
 Major General H.C. Ingles
 Alt: Colonel W.T. Guest
 Brig. General H.M. McClelland
 Alt: Colonel T. Rives
 Captain W.B. Ammon, USN
 Executive Officer - Lt. Colonel
 R. L. Walker
 Secy. - Captain G. B. Myers, USN
 Deputy Secy. - Lt. Colonel
 David Mackey

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEERepresentatives of the British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (London)

Colonel B.J.M. Sebb
 Captain T.C.T. Wynne, R.N.
 Colonel E.F.B. Cook
 Group Captain G.G.H. DuBoulay
 Sir George Sansom - Embassy
 Secy. - Major J.A. Davison

Joint Intelligence Committee

Rear Admiral R.E. Schulmann,
 Chairman
 Major General Clayton L. Bissell
 Major General James P. Hodges
 The Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
 (Assistant Secy. of State)
 Mr. William T. Stone
 (Director, Special Areas
 Branch, F.E.A.)
 Brig. General John Magruder
 (O.S.S.)

Secy. - Lt. Colonel James S. Lay
 Asst. Secy. - Lt. Colonel
 C. Bowie Millican
 Asst. Secy. - Lt. (jg) John
 K. M. Tibby, Jr.

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE STAFFBritish Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington

Colonel B.J.M. Sebb - Chairman
 Captain T.C.T. Wynne, R.N.
 Colonel E.F.B. Cook
 Group Captain G.G.H. DuBoulay
 Sir George Sansom - Embassy
 Lt. Comdr. J.H. Buscombe, RNVR
 Major A.W. Horner
 Wing Commander Sir F. Nelson, RAF
 S/Ldr. V.R.B. Bzash, RAF
 Mr. R.H. Radow - Embassy
 Secy. - Major J.A. Davison

Joint Intelligence Staff

Captain C.B. McVay, I.I., USN -
 Chairman
 Colonel M.W. Moss
 Colonel L.L. Montague
 Mr. Raymond Cox (State Dept.)
 Mr. Max Wags (F.E.A.)
 Major S.E. Gleason (G.I.)
 Captain H. de B. Clairmont, USN
 Lt. Colonel C.H. Muir
 Commander H.L. Abbott
 Lt. Colonel K.T. Gould
 Lt. Colonel James K. Smith
 Lt. Colonel J.P. Harrison
 Lt. Comdr. W.M. McGowan (USN)
 Secy. - Lieut. Roy P. Thorne, USN
 Asst. Secy. -
 Lt. (jg) Gregory Pennington

RESTRICTEDJOINT LOGISTICS COMMITTEE

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick
 Rear Admiral A. W. Fadford
 Major General W. A. Wood, Jr.
 Brig. General P. H. Tansey
 Captain R. G. Tobin, USN
 Colonel D. W. Benner

Secy. - Colonel C. H. Donnelly
 Asst. Secy. - Lt. Colonel R. B. Pegram, Jr.

JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS COMMITTEE

Captain T. L. Schumacher, USN
 Captain C. R. Bennehoff, USN
 Captain R. P. McConnell, USN
 Colonel V. J. Esposito
 Colonel H. J. Vandersluis
 Colonel R. Paul Dellinger

Secy. - Major R. B. Klemann
 Asst. Secy. - Lieut. H. F. Wright, USNR

MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Chairman

British Members

Admiral Sir Percy Noble
 Repr: Rear Adm. J.W.A.
 Waller
 Lt. General G. N. Macready
 Repr: Brig. Gen.
 J. T. Godfrey
 Air Marshal Sir William
 L. Walsh
 Repr: Air Vice Marshal
 R. P. Willock
 Captain E.M.C. Abel-Smith, RN

Executive Staff -
 Group Captain L. T.
 Stickley
 Colonel J. A. Hasler
 Lt. Genr. F. A. R. McNab

Secretary -
 Group Capt. T.E.H. Birley

United States Members

Admiral J. M. Reeves
 Lt. General B. B. Somervell
 Lt. General B. M. Giles
 Rear Admiral W. R. Purnell
 Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick
 Major General R. L. Maxwell

Executive -
 Brig. General J. Y. York, Jr.
 Assts. to Executive -
 Lt. Colonel Craig Miller
 Lt. Colonel R. W. Jones
 Lt. Colonel V. M. Martin, Jr.

Chief, Statistical Analysis
 Branch -
 Mr. I. Rubin

Secy. - Colonel E. C. Kieckhefer
 Joint Munitions Allocation Com.

Admiral J. M. Reeves
 Lt. General B. B. Somervell
 Lt. General B. M. Giles
 Rear Admiral W. R. Purnell
 Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick
 Major General R. L. Maxwell
 Brig. General J. Y. York, Jr.
 Lt. Colonel R. W. Jones

Secy. - Colonel E. C. Kieckhefer

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERSBritish Joint Staff Planners

Captain L. E. Porter, RN
 Brigadier J. C. Haydon
 Air Commodore H. E. Nowell, RAF

Secretary - Major J.A. Davison

British Joint Planning Staff

Commander H. B. C. Gill, RN
 Lt. Colonel D. Kirkness
 Group Capt. W. T. Clyde, RAF

Secretary - Major J. A. Davison

U.S. Joint Staff Planners

Rear Admiral D. B. Duncan
 Brig. General F. N. Roberts
 Brig. General R. C. Lindsay
 Captain James Fife, USN

Secy. - Colonel C. H. Donnelly
 Asst. Secy.-Lt. Comdr. F.J.Green

Joint War Plans Committee

Brig.General W.W. Bessell, Jr
 Brig.General F.F. Everest
 Commodore E. W. Burrough
 Colonel D. R. Nimmer, USMC
 Colonel J. N. Stone
 Captain G. H. Bahm, USN
 Captain W. G. Linton, USN
 Captain W. F. Fitzgerald, Jr., USN
 Colonel R. H. Lee
 Colonel E. G. Hagen, USMC
 Colonel C. S. Balcock
 Captain R. L. Dennison, USN
 Colonel P. L. Freeman
 Colonel M. L. Menckle
 Commander J. D. Griffin
 Lt. Colonel F. S. Harry

Secy. - Major J. T. Hullis
 Asst. Secy. - Captain C. C.
 Goode
 Asst. Secy. - Lt. D. M.
 Gribbon, USNR
 Asst. Secy. - Ens. W. J. Phelps

COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEEBritish Joint Administrative Committee

Commodore A. W. Clarke, RN
 Major General A. W. Lee
 Alt. Brigadier C.E.S. Dobbs
 Air Commodore H. E. Nowell, RAF

Secretary - Major J.A. Davison

U.S. Members

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick
 Rear Admiral A. J. Ralston
 Major General W.A. Wood, Jr.
 Brig. General P. H. Tansy
 Captain R. G. Tobin, USN
 Colonel D. W. Bender

Secy. - Colonel C. H. Donnelly
 Asst. Secy. - Lt. Colonel
 P. B. Griffin, Jr.

RESTRICTEDROSTER OF C.C.S. COMMITTEES
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1944THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFRepresentatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff

Field Marshal Sir John Dill
~~General Sir Percy Noble~~
 Lt. General G. N. Macready
~~Air Marshal Sir Wm. E. Welsh~~

Secretary -
 Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones
 Deputy Secretary -
 Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral William D. Leahy
 General G. C. Marshall
 Admiral E. J. King
 General H. H. Arnold

Secretary -
 Brig. General A. J. McFarland
 Deputy Secretary -
 Captain E. D. Graves, Jr., USN
 Executive Secretary -
 Colonel C. H. Leck
 Supply Secretary -
 Colonel Don E. Lowry
 Asst. Secy., Communications
 Colonel F. W. Wozniarski
 Assistant Executive Secretary -
 Colonel G. C. Epley
 Assistant Deputy Secretary -
 Lt. Colonel W. T. Chapman, Jr.

Administrative Section
 Colonel C. J. Gridley
 Captain A. H. Hyde, USN
 Lt. Colonel Gordon Deane

Military Permit Section -
 Colonel E. R. Sweeney

JOINT DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF

Lt. General J. T. McNamara
 Vice Admiral C. G. Edwards

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE

Lt. General Stanley D. Embury
 Vice Admiral Russell Wilson
 Major General Mair S. Pritchard

Secretary - Colonel Eric F. Cross


JOINT PRODUCTION SURVEY COMMITTEE

Vice Admiral Roland M. Brainard
 Major General Richard L. Moore
 Rear Admiral Thomas B. Brown
 Lt. Col. James F. McManis

Secretary, Commander J. L. Hill

ROSTER

COMBINED CHIEF OF STAFF COMMITTEES



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


CHART-ORG. of U.S.
Secretariat, C.C.S.

CHART
ORGANIZATION OF U. S. SECRETARIAT
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF



RESTRICTED

The Combined Chiefs of Staff and Supporting Agencies

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff	2. The Joint Staff
3. The Joint Staff	4. The Joint Staff
5. The Joint Staff	6. The Joint Staff
7. The Joint Staff	8. The Joint Staff
9. The Joint Staff	10. The Joint Staff
11. The Joint Staff	12. The Joint Staff
13. The Joint Staff	14. The Joint Staff
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17. The Joint Staff	18. The Joint Staff
19. The Joint Staff	20. The Joint Staff
21. The Joint Staff	22. The Joint Staff
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25. The Joint Staff	26. The Joint Staff
27. The Joint Staff	28. The Joint Staff
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31. The Joint Staff	32. The Joint Staff
33. The Joint Staff	34. The Joint Staff
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81. The Joint Staff	82. The Joint Staff
83. The Joint Staff	84. The Joint Staff
85. The Joint Staff	86. The Joint Staff
87. The Joint Staff	88. The Joint Staff
89. The Joint Staff	90. The Joint Staff
91. The Joint Staff	92. The Joint Staff
93. The Joint Staff	94. The Joint Staff
95. The Joint Staff	96. The Joint Staff
97. The Joint Staff	98. The Joint Staff
99. The Joint Staff	100. The Joint Staff



CHART

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES

RESTRICTED

JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT (J.N.W.): facilitates research and development of new weapons and equipment.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL (J.S.C.): is charged with preventing information of military value from falling into the hands of the enemy, and with such other duties as may be directed.

ARMY NAVY PETROLEUM BOARD (A.N.P.B.): performs duties pertaining to petroleum and petroleum products, effecting cooperation between the War and Navy Departments on such matters, maintaining liaison with the Petroleum Administrator for War, and collaborating with the Joint Logistics Committee.

JOINT POST-WAR COMMITTEE (J.P.W.C.): under over-all guidance of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, advises on post-war military problems except those of post-war international organization and civil affairs.

The Secretariat is a group of officers serving as indicated below.

COMBINED SECRETARIAT: maintains for the Combined Chiefs of Staff necessary records, prepares and distributes essential papers, and performs such other work as is assigned to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: performs for the Joint Chiefs of Staff such secretarial and other duties as may be required. The Secretary serves as the United States Secretary of the Combined Secretariat and the secretary of each joint committee which furnishes members to a Combined agency serves as the United States secretary of the Combined group.

29 September 1944.

RESTRICTED

The following committees are agencies of the Combined Chiefs of Staff whose United States members do not function separately as Joint Committees. Both have United States and British members and the C.S.C. has Canadian representatives as well.

COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (C.C.A.C.): recommends general policies for civil affairs in areas under enemy control which are or will be occupied as a result of Combined operations, and handles civil affairs problems under such policies when approved.

COMBINED SHIPBUILDING COMMITTEE (C.S.C.): is charged with advising all interested agencies on methods of achieving maximum possible standardization of design, equipment and layout in the United States, Great Britain and Canada in the light of operational experience and requirements, and with recommending the proper introduction of operational improvements.

The following agencies are those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which do not function as part of a Combined Group.

JOINT DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF (J.D.C.S.): form an executive agency to interpret and implement the known policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to act on matters requiring decision which are referred to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE (J.S.S.C.): advises on matters of grand and military strategy.

JOINT PRODUCTION SURVEY COMMITTEE (J.P.S.C.): advises on matters pertaining to the balancing of production against requirements in accordance with the strategic situation.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (O.S.S.): collects and analyzes such strategic information as may be required for military operations, and plans and conducts operations not assigned to other government agencies.

RESTRICTED

JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF (J.I.S.): functions as permanent joint committee for the Joint Intelligence Committee.

COMBINED MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE (C.M.T.C.): advises on transportation problems, and acts to determine and supply shipping for overseas requirements.

JOINT MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE (J.M.T.C.): performs duties relating to military overseas transportation.

COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS BOARD (C.C.B.): takes such action as may be necessary to coordinate methods, procedures, operation, and all combined communication matters of universal application.

JOINT COMMUNICATIONS BOARD (J.C.B.): makes recommendations to United States communications policies, and coordinates all communications matters of joint United States application.

COMBINED METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEE (C.M.C.): takes such action as may be necessary to coordinate basic methods and all other meteorological matters of combined application.

JOINT METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEE (J.M.C.): has cognizance of meteorological matters, and takes such action as may be necessary to coordinate basic methods and all other meteorological matters of joint application.

MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENT BOARD, WASHINGTON (M.A.B.): working in collaboration with the corresponding London organization, handles duties relating to the assignment of munitions and the balancing of resources against stated requirements.

JOINT MUNITIONS ALLOCATIONS COMMITTEE (J.M.A.C.): performs duties relating to the assignment of munitions and the balancing of resources against stated requirements, and maintains close liaison with the Joint Logistics Committee.

RESTRICTED

All Combined Committees function in behalf of and as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. All Joint agencies function in behalf of and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS (C.P.S.): make studies, drafts and plans, and perform such other work as assigned.

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS (J.P.S.): prepare joint war plans and review recommendations of other agencies when such recommendations concern joint war plans or joint operations, acting in coordination with the Joint Logistics Committee to insure the integration of strategical and logistical considerations.

JOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEE (J.W.P.C.): prepares and submits war plans, studies and estimates to the Joint Staff Planners working in close liaison with the Joint Logistics Plans Committee.

COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE (C. Ad. C.): studies and submits recommendations on administrative matters, keeping closely in touch with the Combined Staff Planners.

JOINT LOGISTICS COMMITTEE (J.L.C.): constitutes the primary logistics advisory and planning agency, and considers matters under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff not assigned to other agencies, working closely with the Joint Staff Planners.

JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS COMMITTEE (J.L.P.C.): prepares and submits plans, studies and estimates to the Joint Logistics Committee, and works in close liaison with the Joint War Plans Committee.

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (C.I.C.): collects and classifies military intelligence.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (J.I.C.): furnishes military intelligence.

RESTRICTEDTHE AGENCIES AND FUNCTIONS

OF THE

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF (C.C.S.): comprise the United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff; the latter have accredited representatives in Washington. Under the direction of the heads of their governments, the Combined Chiefs of Staff collaborate in the formulation and execution of policies and plans concerning: (a) the strategic conduct of the war; (b) the broad program of war requirements, based on approved strategic policy; (c) the allocation of munition resources based on strategic needs and the availability of means of transportation; (d) the requirements for overseas transportation for the fighting services of the United Nations, based on approved strategic priority.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (J.C.S.): comprise the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. Under the direction of the President they consult together on matters of joint concern to the armed forces and advise the President as to their use and take appropriate action to implement his plans and policies as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff comprise the United States membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The following agencies are those of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their counterparts which serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Combined agencies have United States and British (and, where so indicated, Dominions) representatives. The United States membership of each Combined committee is furnished by the Joint committee, which is listed following it.

SECRET

followed by concise analytical reports grouped under uniform headings; e.g., "Business and Finance", "Political Parties and Activities", etc. Maps, charts, pictures, and diagrams would be included where desirable. A specimen table of contents is attached as Section "C" (page 30).

The organization will contain three research divisions: Political, Geographic, and Economic; a Map Division, and a Central Information Division, including a library and extensive personality files. The files embody comprehensive data on known individuals and are considered highly important. They are more fully described in Section "D" (page 31).

Section "E" (page 32) lists the personnel, drawn almost exclusively from individuals now with OSS, which will ultimately constitute the Research and Analysis Staff.

JMS 610/0

- 25 - Exhibit "C" to Tab "A" to App. 2
Appendix to Enclosure "B"

SECRET**EXHIBIT "C"****RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS**

A primary function of OSS is to analyze and synthesize intelligence concerning political, economic, and social developments in Germany, and to prepare reports that describe and interpret these developments.

The analysis of information can be done intelligently only by personnel who have acquired an intimate familiarity with the background against which current events must be measured. OSS specialists have been engaged in intelligence analysis and reporting for over three years. Central European and Economic Sections particularly have been gathering information and preparing intelligence reports on German affairs during all that period. For instance, OSS has prepared, or participated in the preparation of 65 Civil Affairs Guides for Germany. A complete listing of these guides is attached as Section "A" to this Exhibit. In addition to the Guides, scores of reports on German problems have been prepared for appropriate officials of the War, Navy, and State Departments. A representative list is found in Section "B" (page 28).

The following program of reporting is proposed:

1. A regular weekly report for distribution to the American officials in Germany.
2. Special reports, usually with a high security classification, supplementary to the regular weekly report and dealing with subjects that cannot otherwise be covered adequately.
3. Studies specifically requested by American authorities.

The most important of the undertakings may well be the issuance of the regular weekly report. Each issue would per-
with a brief review of outstanding developments of the week.

JVS 610/5

- 24 - Exhibit "C" to "A" to "B" to Appendix to Enclosure "B"

SECRET

Field Headquarters Unit, and four Field Detachments. Personnel requirements for these units are estimated as follows:

	<u>Officers and Professional</u>	<u>Enlisted Men and Clerical</u>
Office of Chief and Headquarters	7	13
Field Headquarters	10	23
Field Detachments	12*	12*
Total	29	48

* This is based on four Field Detachments.

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Exhibit "B" to Tab "A"
 Annex to Appendix to
 Enclosure "B"

SECRET

2. Advice regarding personnel, organizations, etc., which are engaged in Germany in espionage or other subversive activities directed against the Allies, and suggestions as to the best means for neutralizing such activities.

3. Performance of a security-checking service against German nationals through its voluminous name files dealing with individuals who may have been connected with enemy intelligence organizations. These files complement those referred to in Exhibit "C" and Section "D" thereto.

4. Assistance in the analysis and evaluation, from the CE standpoint, of the voluminous German documents which will become available regarding the activities of German individuals, firms, associations, etc.

5. Supplying counter-intelligence interrogation service, based on special sources, for use in special cases.

6. Furnishing certain top secret materials available only through the agency of O.S.S.

7. Providing a continuous flow of CE information on Germany and the German underground based on data supplied from units in other theaters and neutral and liberated countries and through the counter-espionage services of other Allied governments.

8. The operation of such counter-espionage networks, directed in particular against the Nazi underground, as may appear necessary or desirable.

9. It is proposed that the counter-espionage staff in Germany will include that personnel which at present is working in Germany or which is attached to the 12th Army Group and 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 9th Armies. In addition, it is proposed to add counter officers or civilian equivalents will be required to furnish a unit at the Allied Control Council Headquarters, and

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Exhibit "B" to Tab "A" to
Appendix to
Enclosure "B"

SECRET**EXHIBIT "B"****COUNTER-ESPIONAGE**

1. U.S.S. is responsible for collecting, analyzing, evaluating, and processing information regarding espionage and related subversive activities outside the Western Hemisphere directed against the United States and her Allies. This responsibility includes the protection of the operational security of American or Allied secret intelligence activities, and for this purpose special lists of enemy espionage figures have been prepared for theater commanders as well as other American and Allied agencies. U.S.S. Counter-Espionage work in military or Allied Control Council areas now is and will continue to be conducted in close coordination and cooperation with Army CIC and other appropriate security or enforcement agencies.

2. U.S.S. has had as a constant and principal objective CE operations against Germany. The occupying force in Germany will require the highest degree of security for its personnel and operations. In addition, it will also wish to break up the present German intelligence services and keep a careful check on their personnel, who may attempt to go underground or act as focal points for German resistance to Allied armistice terms. The unquestioned high quality and experience of enemy intelligence personnel, coupled with a hostile population, will make this a difficult task, requiring specialized counter-espionage information and techniques, such as is now being furnished through the SGI Detachment at 12th Army Group and its liaison officers with 1st, 3rd, 7th and 9th Armies.

3. HGI services are based on the special sources available to U.S.S., and consist of:

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EXHIBIT "B" to Part "A" to
 Annex to Appendix to
 Enclosure "B"

	<u>Officers & Professional</u>	<u>Enlisted Men & Clerical</u>
<u>Office of Chief</u>		
Chief	1	1
Assistant Chief	1	1
Executive Officer	1	1
Administrative Officer	1	
Personal	1	
Special Funds		
<u>Division of Intelligence</u>		
<u>Intelligence</u>		
Military Section	3	1
Political Section	4	2
Economic Section	4	2
Scientific Section	4	2
Labor Section	5	1
Religious-Education Section	3	
<u>Division of Intelligence</u>		
<u>Intelligence</u>		
Production Office	2	1
C.A. of Agent Units	8	8
(PI to PS)		
	39	23

3: process, edit, reproduce, and disseminate reports
in conjunction with the preparation and dissemination of
intelligence procured by R&A Branch), for the SI
Reports Division and the Joint SI and R&A Registry.

	16	29
	55	52
Total		107

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Exhibit "A" to Tab "A"
Annex to Appendix to
Enclosure "E"

... a more important role in German political and industrial life, and this probability should be exploited. German contacts have already been established with certain and reliable members of German trade unions and with trade union or labor connections in both Germany and Austria. Agents are already in touch with these groups. As soon as established relations will exist with groups who have proved their good faith by having furnished reliable intelligence. Thus, during the occupation period this previous experience will result in the receipt of intelligence from labor sources, and further, will yield accurate information on the size, organization, and activities of labor unions and associated groups. It may also be possible to encourage labor organizations to cooperate in the work of recovering Nazi underground activities.

During the past two years OSS offices in neutral countries, particularly Switzerland and Sweden, have been following German developments in various scientific fields, especially new inventions and devices, secret weapons, poison gases, bacteriological warfare, etc. Relations have been established with neutral scientists and experts and through these and other channels certain secret contacts have already been made with German scientists. In this way information has been obtained as to best sources to exploit. Immediately after the German breakdown, for scientific data of military value in German disarmament and for the war against Japan in the Far East,

to conduct such activities inside Germany there will be

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Exhibit "A" to 100
"A" to Annex X to 100
101 to Enclosure

SECRET

contracts or by persuasion, bribery, blackmail, theft, or other means. The primary objectives of secret intelligence in Germany include the following:

- (1) Measures to evade destruction of the military machine or otherwise to defeat the terms of occupation.
- (2) Efforts to transfer, conceal, or redeem assets in violation of Allied terms.
- (3) Efforts of key figures to conceal identity or leave Germany.
- (4) The activities, organization, aims, and personnel of underground groups.
- (5) Glandestine relations or efforts to establish relations or communications with any foreign state or groups.
- (6) Political parties, social, religious, educational, industrial, financial, and other associations and societies.
- (7) Scientific developments, patents, processes, and devices.
- (8) Secret documents and other papers.

There are available 100 trained agents competent to function within Germany. They are both male and female, and possess valuable labor, religious, journalistic, educational and other connections inside Germany. Many of them possess demonstrated organizational ability which will enable them quickly to build intelligence chains. For example, contacts with the two main German churches, with industrial and financial circles, and with trade associations will be utilized for the procurement of intelligence and the discovery of anti-Nazi sentiment.

A special effort will be made to work with prominent German women and women's groups. It is believed that the German loss of manpower during the war will result in women

JTS 420/D

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EXHIBIT "A" to "A" to
Annex to Appendix to
Enclosure "B"

SECRET**EXHIBIT "A"****SECRET INTELLIGENCE**

Secret intelligence will be collected from outside Germany as well as inside:

(a) From outside:

(1) Neutral countries. OSS secret intelligence units will continue to work in Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey on those aspects of German activity (flight of assets, flight of personnel, political intrigue, and subversive propaganda) which can be more advantageously carried on by a defeated Germany in those countries.

(2) Allied countries. The intimate association developed over more than two years with the British, Norwegian, Danish, Dutch, Belgian, French, Luxembourg, and Czech secret intelligence services and with Yugoslav and Greek Intelligence Units will be continued in the job of surrounding Germany and penetrating it during occupation. Appropriate OSS personnel are now working with the Allied services in the United Kingdom and also in such countries as have been liberated.

(3) Former enemy countries. Intelligence units with suitable personnel are in Italy, as well as Rumania and Bulgaria, and will be placed in Hungary and Austria.

The primary objective of all units outside Germany will be to direct their efforts against Germany, supply all information to the OSS unit in Germany, and to carry out such intelligence directives as may be furnished from time to time.

(b) From the inside:

Secret intelligence as herein used refers to that which is acquired by clandestine means and is secret in character. Such information can be obtained through friendly

JUL 6/10/42

- 17 - Exhibit "A" to Tab "A" to Annex to Appendix to Enclosure "B"

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functions. Military personnel can be accommodated within existing ranks and grades allotted to OSS. It is contemplated that a small unit of key persons will be dispatched to Germany at the earliest practicable moment. These will be augmented within the limits set forth above, as the opportunity for effective work is presented.

The unit would maintain its own communications and would be in contact with OSS missions in the neutral and liberated countries of Europe. These missions have been focusing their attention particularly on Nazi activities and matters relating to Germany.

A more detailed outline of functions and personnel is contained in the attached memoranda as follows:

Exhibit "A"	(page 17)	- Secret Intelligence.
Exhibit "B"	(page 21)	- Counter-Espionage.
Exhibit "C"	(page 24)	- Research and Analysis.
Exhibit "D"	(page 33)	- Communications.
Exhibit "E"	(page 34)	- Office of Director, Administrative Services.
Exhibit "F"	(page 35)	- Summary.

SECRET

(4) To assist in obtaining information through clandestine methods respecting German scientific developments, particularly in the field of secret weapons and processes.

(5) To conduct such clandestine measures of psychological warfare as may be desired by SHAEF or US Group CC.

(7) To make available small operational units to perform any task assigned by SHAEF or US Group CC, particularly during the period prior to the complete pacification of Germany.

(8) To supply and service personality files and indices that have been developed on German individuals.

It is proposed that headquarters of the OSS unit will be located with the German Headquarters of SHAEF, and later with the Group CC, and Branch headquarters with the headquarters of the Commanding General, U.S. Forces. Units would be established in other important places in the American Zone as they might be authorized.

OSS units now operating with American Armies, to the extent that they include suitable personnel for work in Germany, would be combined with the definitive German unit as soon as the occupation is completed.

The main OSS unit would be ready to go to Germany when the occupation is completed or at an earlier date if SHAEF so indicates. In the event of a period of disorder in Germany prior to the complete occupation, advance elements such as SHAEF might approve would be ready to be sent to strategic points.

As shown on Exhibit "y" (page 35), the initial strength envisioned is 206 officers & professional and 286 enlisted men & specialists, including tentative estimates of personnel required for services, communications, security, and administrative

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- 15 - Tab "A" to Annex 10
Appendix to Enclosure "B"

SECRET**TAB "A"****PROPOSAL FOR OSS UNIT FOR GERMANY**

OSS has now established in the European Theater of Operations and in neutral European countries an extensive organization directed to the gathering of clandestine intelligence on Germany, preparing studies on all phases of German political, economic, and military matters, and initiating subversive activities against Germany. In the conduct of its work OSS has built up sizeable records and a broad background of information and experience on Germany.

It is proposed that a unit taken from existing OSS personnel competent on German affairs be sent to Germany to serve under the direction and control of SHAEF and eventually the US Group Control Council, and to render the following types of services, as well as such others as may be assigned to it:

- (1) To collect by clandestine methods intelligence of a military, political, sociological, and economic character; and to assist in obtaining records and documentary material relating to the German war effort and Nazi organizations. Such documentary material would include particularly information regarding Nazi activities in other countries, past, present, and prospective, and documentary information in German files of possible value for the Far Eastern War.
- (2) To prepare analyses of and reports on German political, economic, and social developments.
- (3) To carry on a counter-espionage service directed at uncovering underground and subversive Nazi activities and individuals.
- (4) To procure intelligence on German conditions through labor channels.

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Tab "A" to Annex to
Appendix to Enclosure "B"

SECRET**TAB "A"**

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
Office of Strategic Services
U.K. Base
(Main)

APD 413
22 November 1944

SUBJECT: Program for OSS Unit for Germany
TO: Acting Deputy, U.S. Group C.C.

1. Here is forwarded herewith a paper (page 14) on the above subject for your consideration and ultimate transmission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The submission is made in accordance with cable #12818 from AGWAR Joint Chiefs of Staff to EISENHOWER, Action ETOWSA, dated 30 September 1944. This cable was referred to OSS for review by SECUSA.

/s/ LESTER ARMOUR
Cmdr., USMP
Commanding

Attachment:
as cited

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Tab "A" to ALLOX 10
Appendix to Report "A"

SECRET

4. G-2 SCS 16 Jan 1945 G-3's comments noted and concurred in.

For the A.C. of S., G-2:

/s/ T. F. BOGART
Colonel, GSC
Executive Officer.

Incl:
n/c

5. SCS US Group CC 17 Jan 1945 Returned for consideration of comments by G-3 at Item 3.

/s/ CARTER L. BURGESS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

Incl:
n/c
JNA/jt

6. US GP SCS CC 29 Jan 1945 1. G-3's comments at Item 3 concurred in.

2. The comments under reference have been incorporated in a revision of the letter of 18 December 1944 to the Chief of Staff, US Army Forces, EPO, which is forwarded herewith together with Tabs A, B, and C for submission to the Chief of Staff.

3. Mr. Murphy concurs in present letter.

/s/ C. W. WICKERSHAM
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Acting Deputy

Incl:
Tabs A,B,C.

SECRET**COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP****SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE****SUBJECT: O.S.S. Mission for GERMANY**

25 December 1944

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	SGS	G-2	25 Dec 1944	The attached Staff Study, subject: "O.S.S. Mission for GERMANY", dated 18 December, from the US Group CC, is forwarded to you for comments and/or concurrence, and return to this office.
		G-3	(1st turn)	

/s/ CARTER L. BURGESS,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Secretary, General Staff.

Incl: As above.
IFF/jt

2.	G-2	G-3	31 Dec 1944	G-2 Division concurs in the proposal to establish an O.S.S. Mission to Germany.
----	-----	-----	-------------	---

For the A.C. of S., G-2:

/s/ T. F. BOGART,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.,
Executive, G-2 Division

1 Incl:
n/c

17240/12/Ops(C) OCT/370-6/Ops(C)

3.	G-3	SGS	15 Jan 1945	1. G-3 concurs in the attached staff study, "O.S.S. Mission for GERMANY" subject to the following amendments:
		(thru G-2)		

a. Substitution of "study of" for "reporting on" in paragraph 4a line 2.

b. Substitution of "Commanding General" for "Deputy" in paragraph 4c line 7.

c. Addition of unlettered paragraph following paragraph 4c as follows: "Following the dissolution of SHAEF when the US organization for the occupation of Germany has been decided, command relationships between O.S.S. and the US Group Control Council and the US Theater Headquarters will be subject to review."

d. Addition to paragraph 5a (1) by changing period to a comma, adding "and to substitution of sense of studying rather than of reporting on developments in GERMANY".

For the AC of S., G-3:

/s/ A.S. NEVINS,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief, Ops Section

APP 610/D

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Annex to Appendix to
Enclosure "B"

SECRET

of political reporting / regards the post-military period of control in Germany. Mr. Murphy's memorandum of 10 December 1944 and my reply thereto are attached as Tab B.

2. Recommendations:

a. It is recommended that:

(1) The O.S.S. proposal of 22 November 1944 (Tab A, page 13) be approved, subject to the understandings contained in paragraph 4 a, b, c and d above and to substitution throughout of sense of studying rather than of reporting on developments in Germany.

(2) The attached file, with your approval and recommendation be dispatched to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) The attached draft of a cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab C, page 40) be dispatched.

(4) O.S.S. (London) be directed to form a small nucleus of O.S.S. officers:

(a) To assist the US Group CC during the planning period;

(b) To be attached to SHAEF at time and in such numbers as SCAEF may direct, for the purpose of accompanying the US Group CC to Berlin and assisting it there, subject to G-2 SHAEF control during the SHAEF period of responsibility in Germany; thereafter to serve under the US Group CC.

/s/ C. W. WICKERHAM
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Acting Deputy

ME 610/b

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Annex to Appendix to
Enclosure "B"

SECRET

agreements with policies prescribed by SHAEP and will be controlled by the G-2 Division thereof (paragraph 3, J.C.S. 1000/1). Following the SHAEP period of responsibility in Germany, the O.S.S. Mission in Berlin would serve under the direction and control of the Commanding General, US Group CC, through the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Group (in which the O.S.S. Mission in Berlin would be represented) and through the Intelligence Coordinating Section of Group Headquarters. Steps would also be taken to ensure that the O.S.S. Mission works in close cooperation and coordination with the Political Adviser. (See subparagraph d below). In both periods, O.S.S. personnel stationed outside the Berlin area would operate under the direction and control of G-2 of the appropriate U.S. Zone or District Headquarters, with technical channels of communication to the head O.S.S. office in Berlin. Following the dissolution of SHAEP when the U.S. organization for the occupation of GERMANY has been decided, working relationships between O.S.S. and both US Group Control Council and the US Theater Headquarters will be subject to review.

d. Relation of O.S.S. Mission to Political Adviser, US Group CC.

In view of the special responsibilities of the Political Adviser in matters of political reporting, the Deputy of the US Group CC will see that the O.S.S. Mission works in close cooperation and coordination with the Political Adviser, both directly and through the Joint Intelligence Committee of the US Group CC. Ambassador Murphy has been consulted on this point and concurs in the present recommendations as regards the period of military control (i.e., by the Tripartite Control Council) in Germany. He adds, however, that it would be highly desirable for O.S.S. and the Department of State to work out appropriate relationships and procedures in respect

JVS 610/D

- 9 - Annex to Appendix to
Enclosure "B"

SECRET**A. Present O.S.S. Proposal:**

The London office of O.S.S. has now submitted a proposal under date of 22 November 1944 (Tab A, page 13) for an O.S.S. Mission in Germany:

B. Scope:

To carry out certain functions of secret intelligence, counter espionage, and research and analysis, including study of German political, economic and social developments during the period of military control by the Tripartite Control Council. The activities envisaged constitute a continuation in Germany of recognized O.S.S. functions now being carried out by O.S.S. in this theater under the control of SHAEF.

C. Personnel:

The plan provides for an ultimate number of 208 O.S.S. officers or professional personnel, and 285 enlisted or civilian for all Germany, the bulk of whom would be located outside Berlin, in Army Group, Army of Corps areas. A small nucleus of O.S.S. officers would be formed by O.S.S. (London) to assist the US Group CC during the planning period, such nucleus with any required additional personnel to be later attached to SHAEF at such time as SCAEF may direct for the purpose of accompanying the US Group CC to Berlin. Expansion to full operational strength would be regulated by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces, ETO. All operating O.S.S. personnel would be provided by O.S.S. without calling upon the War and Navy Departments for additional assistance. O.S.S. personnel would not be charged against the T/D of the US Group CC.

D. Organization and Command:

During the SHAEF period of responsibility in Germany, the O.S.S. Mission for Berlin would accompany and assist the US Group CC, but all O.S.S. activities in Germany, including those of the O.S.S. Mission, will be carried on strictly in

JMS 610/D

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Annex to Appendix
Encls. "B"

SECRET**ANNEX****US GROUP CC
AFG 742**

18 December 1944

O.S.S. Mission for Germany.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces, ETO.

REFERENCE:

- 1. J.C.S. 1035/1 and 1035/2;
- 2. War Department cable W-39374, 9 October 1944.

DISCUSSION:

1. The establishment of an O.S.S. Mission for Germany as authorized in principle by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in War Department cable W-39374, 9 October 1944 (page 25 of J.C.S. 1035/2).

DETAILS:

1. A proposal submitted by the London office of O.S.S. for the establishment of an O.S.S. Mission for Germany to be attached to the US Group CC was approved by you on behalf of the Theater Commander and forwarded for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under date of 13 September 1944. It was referred by them to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for comment and recommendation.

2. The recommendation made by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee under date of 26 September 1944 (J.C.S. 1035/2), War Department cable W-39374, 9 October 1944, was dispatched to the Theater Commander advising that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved in principle of the proposal in question, but desired that plans for the formation of O.S.S. Mission showing scope, organization and number of personnel involved be forwarded between Theater Headquarters and O.S.S. and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final approval.

WTS SMO/D

- 7 - Annex to Appendix to
Enclosure "B"

SECRET

NOTE: Attached to original of this brief was a SHAEF office memo with following notation:

General SMITH:

In accordance with your instructions, the letter at TAB "D" (page 41) has been redrafted to include paragraph 5 of the brief and is submitted for your signature.

C.L.B.

6 FEB 1945

**TO: U.S. Group Control
Gen. WICKERSHAM**

C/S has signed the letter with certain amendments.

/s/ C. L. BURGESS

JPS 610/D

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Appendix to Enclosure "F"

REMARKS

During the Supreme Headquarters, AEF period of responsibility in Germany, the O.S.S. Mission for Berlin would coordinate and assist the U.S. Group C.C., but all O.S.S. activities in Germany, including those of the O.S.S. Mission, will be carried on strictly in accordance with the policies established by Supreme Headquarters, AEF, and will be controlled by the G-2 Division thereof. Following the Supreme Headquarters, AEF period of responsibility, the O.S.S. Mission in Berlin will come under the control of the Commanding General, U.S. Group C.C.

The Deputy of the U.S. Group C.C. will see that the O.S.S. Mission works in close cooperation and coordination with the Political Advisor, both directly and through the Joint Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Group C.C. Mr. Murphy's comments on this matter and General Wickersham's reply thereto are at TAB "B" (page 36).

RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is recommended that:

1. The O.S.S. proposal at TAB "A" (page 13) be approved.
2. The attached file be dispatched to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. The cable at TAB "C" (page 40) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff be approved.
4. Directive to O.S.S. (London) be signed (Tab "D" page 42).

REMARKS.

1-4 - T.J.S.)

2-3 - A.S.S.) TAB "E" (See Annex, page 7)

Mr. Murphy)

10/1 4 PM 1945
 APPROVED AS AMENDED
 J. D. DUFF
 Major, U.S. Army
 10/1 1945

/s/ DONALD W. FORBES,
 Major, O.S.C.
 Asst. Sec. Gen. Staff.

Appendix to Enclosure "B"

SECRETAPPENDIX

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Secretary General Staff

5 February 1945.

SUBJECT: O.S.S. Mission for Germany.

TO: The Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION.

General Wickersham submits a staff study (Annex, page 7) on the subject of O.S.S. Mission for Germany.

A proposal submitted by the London Office of O.S.S. for the establishment of an O.S.S. Mission for Germany to be attached to the U.S. Group C.C. was approved by you and forwarded for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the proposal in principle, but desired that plans for the formation of O.S.S. Mission showing scope, organization and number of personnel involved be concerted between Theater Headquarters and O.S.S. and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final approval.

At TAB "A" (page 13) the London Office of O.S.S. submits a proposal indicating scope, organization and personnel involved in the mission. The scope is to carry out certain functions of intelligence, counter-espionage, and research and analysis, including study of German political, economic and social developments.

The plan provides for an ultimate number of 100 O.S.S. officer or professional personnel, and a detailed schedule for all Germany, the bulk of whom would be located within Berlin, in Army Group, Army or Corps areas. A small number of O.S.S. officers would be formed by O.S.S. Liaison to assist the U.S. Group C.C. during the planning period.

JPS 610/5

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Appendix to Figure "B"

SECRET

ENCLOSURE "B"

U.S. GROUP CC
APO 742

AUTH: A/Deputy, US Gp CC
INIT:
DATE: 9 February 1945

9 February 1945

SUBJECT: O.S.S. Mission for Germany.

TO: Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Constitution Avenue & 19th Street, N.W.,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

In accord with instructions from Chief of Staff,
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the
attached file is forwarded herewith.

For the Acting Deputy:

/s/ NELSON DINGLEY, III
Colonel, GSC,
Executive

1 Encls as stated above.

775 610/0

ENCLOSURE "B"

SECRET

Headline London Office of OSS has been directed to
form small nucleus of OSS Officers to assist Group CC
during planning period.

End

00-11-11300 (11 Feb 45) DTG 111645A mcs

00-11-11300

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Enclosure "A"

ENCLOSURE "A"

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
 War, London, England

To: War Department

Ref: R 15909

11 February 1946

R 15909 to AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff from SHAEF
 War from Wiesbaden from Smith signed Eisenhower.

London Office of GCS has submitted a proposal for an
 mission to Germany in accordance with JCS 1035/2. Plan
 mission continuation in Germany of recognized OSS functions
 in this theater including secret intelligence, counter
 espionage and reporting on political, economic and social
 conditions in Germany, under appropriate G-2 and command
 direction.

Mission contemplates ultimate personnel of 308 officers
 and professional, and 265 enlisted and clerical for all Germany,
 half of whom would be stationed outside Berlin and subject to
 personal command control, the head officer to accompany and
 operate in Group CC, subject however to G-2 SHAEF control
 during initial period of responsibility, and thereafter to
 exercise with US Group CC through intelligence coordinating
 mission of US Group CC.

It is noted that the acting deputy will see that
 and mission works in close cooperation and coordination with
 military services. Murphy has been consulted and concurs as
 proposed period of Military Control in Germany.

Reports recommending approval have been forwarded
 Enclosure "A", page .

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COPY NO. 16

W.F.A. 610/D

15 February 1945

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

DIRECTIVE

O.S.S. MISSION FOR GERMANY

References: a. J.C.S. 1035/2
E. SM-556

Note by the Secretaries

Enclosure "A" (CM-IN-11342 of 11 Feb 45) and
Enclosure "B", the papers referred to in Enclosure "A",
have been referred to the Joint Staff Planners for
consideration and recommendation.

C. H. DONNELLY,

P. J. GREEN,

Joint Secretariat.

W.F.A. 610/D

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Washington, D. C.
20 February 1946.

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. (jg) E. J. Pittsell, Jr.

FROM : Executive Office

SUBJECT : Clearance of JPS 610/D on OSS mission for Germany with Deputy Directors and Branch Chief's Concerned.

In accordance with your instructions I have discussed JPS 610/D on the OSS Mission for Germany with the Deputy Directors and Branch Chiefs concerned. Those with whom I talked included General Magruder, Mr. Room, Mr. Shepardon, Dr. Langer, Lt. Colonel Pfaff and Colonel Lowman. I received the same recommendation from all that the only comment OSS should return to the Joint Staff Planners (if such comment be called for) is that OSS is satisfied with the document as it stands.

I did not talk with Colonel Bigelow, Mr. Fister or Lt. Colonel Hoffman, inasmuch as the memorandum does not specify details as to an organization for undertaking possible MO or SO operations. On the other hand, the memorandum does include under Sections 6 and 7 of the Introductory Section (Page 15) general statements which establish the jurisdiction of OSS with respect to MO and SO operations in Germany during the period of Military Government if these are necessary. This arrangement had the approval of the Chiefs of MO and SO, as well as Colonel Bigelow, when the paper was discussed in November prior to its being returned by General Donovan to OSS/STO.

John D. Wilson


 SECRET

Washington, D. C.
20 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. (JG) E. J. Putzell, Jr.

FROM: Executive Office

SUBJECT: Clearance of JPS 610/D on OSS mission for Germany with Deputy Directors and Branch Chiefs Concerned.

In accordance with your instructions I have discussed JPS 610/D on the OSS Mission for Germany with the Deputy Directors and Branch Chiefs concerned. Those with whom I talked included General Magruder, Mr. Ream, Mr. Shepardson, Dr. Langer, Lt. Colonel Pfaff and Colonel Lowman. I received the same recommendations from all that the only comment OSS should return to the Joint Staff Planners (if such comment be called for) is that OSS is satisfied with the document as it stands.

I did not talk with Colonel Bigelow, Mr. Fister or Lt. Colonel Hoffman, inasmuch as the memorandum does not specify details as to an organization for undertaking possible MO or SO operations. On the other hand, the memorandum does include under Sections 4 and 7 of the Introductory Section (Page 15) general statements which establish the jurisdiction of OSS with respect to MO and SO operations in Germany during the period of Military Government if these are necessary. This arrangement had the approval of the Chiefs of MO and SO, as well as Colonel Bigelow, when the paper was discussed in November prior to its being returned by General Donovan to OSS/ETO.

John D. Wilson
John D. Wilson

SECRET

Top ↑

SECRET

Date 20 Feb. '45

Colonel Buttle called from
DPO--Extension 2971 with reference
to JCS 610/3. He wants to know
if the General has read it and if
he has any comment on it.

ag

SECRET

4-

Their recommendation is based upon the practical consideration that the information procured, analyzed and processed in the field is to be concerned with Germany as a whole and will include all categories. It therefore would not be appropriate for the OSS Unit to serve as a sub-section of one of the Functional Divisions of the U. S. Group, such as the Political, Economic, Army Ground or Army Air Division.

4. Inasmuch as the organization and control of forces in the U. S. Zone of Germany, as well as the precise relationship between the U. S. Group Control Council and the Zonal organizations are not yet determined, definitive recommendations concerning the position of OSS within the Zonal organization are impractical. However, if command relationships of OSS are required at the end of the period of SHANT responsibility, as is recommended, it should be borne in mind that the work of OSS in the U. S. Zone will be very closely related to that in the U. S. Group C. C. Close communication and liaison between the two units will be essential. As it is proposed the OSS unit in the U. S. Group C. C. serve under the Commanding General, and the latter in all likelihood will also be the Commanding General in the United States Zone, unity of command should be easily achieved.

William J. Donovan
 Director

SECRET

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-3-

Intelligence is to be obtained. Effective direction of clandestine intelligence requires a group thoroughly informed of what information is available, what is needed, and able by reason of this overall knowledge and through close consultation with the ultimate consumers to determine the relative priority of the various needs. The OSS Unit serving under the Commanding General, U. S. Group, will be in a position to organize the use of clandestine sources effectively and without unnecessary waste. Many such sources already developed will continue to be exploited.

1) Through joint activity already established with Secret Intelligence Services of Allied Countries bordering on Germany.

2) Through further utilization of individuals and organized groups within Germany and in Countries bordering on Germany.

D. The Acting Deputy of the U. S. Group Control Council recommended after careful study that OSS report to the Commanding General of the U. S. Group through the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Coordinating Section (the Chief of which is to be the Intelligence Officer, U. S. Group C. C.). This was concurred in by G-2 and G-3, COMUSIA, and approved by the Chief of Staff, COMUSIA, (JCS 1035/2).

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A. The Commanding General of the U. S. Group C. C. will be responsible for difficult decisions concerning Germany as a whole which vitally affect the U. S. National interest. Merely will important problems be exclusively political, economic, or military, and in many instances not only Germany, but other Nations will be involved. In matters of such import it is essential that the Commanding General have full information from sources he himself controls and that such information be analyzed and properly correlated. The OSS Unit has been specially tailored and placed in the organization by the High Command in order to meet this need. None of the functional Divisions of the U. S. Group can fill the need, for each is concerned with one segment of the whole and none possesses means for obtaining information other Nations may wish to obtain.

B. The OSS Unit is to be concerned with procuring and processing into integrated studies political, economic, military and geographic information. Such information and studies will be available to the Commanding General either directly or through the JAC, and are intended to provide a solid base of general information for the specialized inquiries of the various Divisions of the U. S. Group.

C. clandestine means (both Espionage and Counter-Espionage) must be employed if some of the most important

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant Chief of Staff
 Operations Division, WDGS

SUBJECT: : OSS Mission for Germany

REFERENCE: : (a) JCS 1035/1: OSS Mission for Germany
 (b) JCS 1035/2: OSS Mission for Germany
 (c) JCS 1035/3: OSS Mission for Germany

1. I have examined the report by the Joint Staff
 Planners on the Plan for an OSS Mission for Germany (JCS
 1035/3) and concur in the conclusions stated therein.

2. In their discussion the Joint Staff Planners do
 not indicate clearly that it was the initial recommendation
 of the Chief of Staff, ETOUSA, that the OSS Mission serve
 under the direction and control of the U. S. Group Control
 Council (JCS 1035/1), and not under the Commanding General
 of the United States Zone. This was the recommendation the
 U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved in principle (JCS 1035/2)
 and upon this all planning of the OSS Unit has been based.

3. To believe it clear, therefore, that on the basis
 of his experience in the Field, the Chief of Staff, ETOUSA
 (as well as the Acting Deputy of the U. S. Group C. C.) has
 had in mind certain overall needs of the Commanding General
 of the U. S. Group C. C. that could best be serviced by an
 OSS Unit.

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SSS Form 1004a

DATE 20 March 1945

TO: Mrs. O'Donnell

For your files.

Distribution:
 1 - The Assistant Chief of Staff
 Operations Division, WDOS
 2 - Director's File
 1 - Lt. Futsell
 2 - ETO, London
 1 - John D. Wilson's file.

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FROM: _____ EXT. _____

13 APR 1945

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(a) As already indicated, the territorial questions of the great powers are likely to be, in the main, undetermined and there is no reason to believe -- on the contrary, a great deal of reason not to believe -- that an international security organization can have anything to do with these questions. As to other territorial questions, it will, in general, be found that they touch closely the security interests of two or three of the great powers that a bilateral or a tri-partite agreement is a prerequisite for international cooperation in dealing with them. Such, for example, is likely to be the situation with respect to German territory to be ceded to Poland in compensation for Russian acquisitions in the east.

(b) A series of governments not exclusively dominated by either Russia or Britain is prerequisite to an effective and stable international security organization. Without eventual emergence of a neutral government in post-war Germany, in particular, continued cooperation between the great powers will probably not be possible. The emergence of such governments will require either joint action by the powers in the internal affairs of other countries or, at least, an agreement not to intervene unilaterally to influence the course of internal events. Such action or agreement must precede rather than follow the establishment of an effectively functioning international security organization.

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of German resources involves abandonment of self-sufficiency in food and an increase in German industrialization, even to the pre-war levels. Such an industrialization, however, presupposes a large volume of foreign trade; imports, mainly, of food and industrial raw materials and exports, mainly, of manufactured products. This means an integration of the German economy into the European and world economy. It means, further, that a prosperous Europe requires, as a primary condition of its prosperity, a productive Germany. Terms imposed upon Germany, no matter how harsh, will be compatible with the goal of integrating Germany into Europe, if the terms can be and are executed within a reasonably short period, if such terms do not provide for permanent political, territorial or economic dismemberment, and if they are progressively relaxed when peaceful, democratic forces become ascendant in Germany.

A divided Germany means a divided Europe. An attempt by Britain to build a western Germany and an attempt by Russia to build an eastern Germany into their respective spheres of influence would be close to inevitable. Under these circumstances it would be next to impossible to maintain that neutrality of the principal European countries between east and west which is the sine qua non of a peaceful world.

3. That the vital issues dividing the great powers can be settled through the mechanism of an international organization.

An effective international security organization would result rather than a condition of the settlement of the issues dividing the great powers. These issues include (a) territorial questions, and (b) questions of sovereignty to be recognized in the post-war world, and (c) the question of foreign influence on such governments.

JUN 1945

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the camera field

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towards Russia for other reasons, why this development in itself should substantially increase Russian influence in Europe. If Britain or the United States should adopt an antagonistic attitude towards local forces, these forces, it is true, will inevitably look to Russia for support. If, however, the United States and Britain are neutral or, better, favorably disposed towards those political groups which give promise of coming into power, there is less likelihood of Bolshevik revolution and orientation toward Russia. Indeed, a definite American and British policy of support to such groups might well give these countries a clear-cut western orientation. For the most part, the historical and cultural orientation of these countries has been to the west rather than to the east, and there is every reason to expect that it will continue to be.

4. That a peaceful and prosperous Europe is possible with a permanently prostrate or divided Germany.

Considerations both of justice and expediency dictate not only the disarmament of Germany, but the imposition of a heavy reparations burden. The productivity of the German economy during the war indicates that, if properly managed, such a reparations burden can be exacted while maintaining a minimum subsistence standard of living for the German population. Moreover, no steps to ameliorate living conditions should be undertaken until peaceful and democratic groups have begun to gain ascendancy within Germany. To go further, however, in attempting permanently to impoverish Germany, or to prevent her, would be to defeat our own aims of an armed and peaceful European settlement.

Germany cannot be made into an agricultural power. She can be self-sufficient agriculturally only by producing very high-cost grain production which is not feasible. There is no possibility of short-term agricultural production standards for farm workers -- if it is to be a permanent agricultural products. Any attempt to make Germany a permanent

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security cooperation a completely neutral attitude towards the great powers on the part of all other governments. What is necessary is to prevent spheres of influence from becoming the basic form of international organization.

2. That the post-war world can be accurately described as a political vacuum with a small number of power centers to which the other countries will inevitably gravitate.

While the various countries of Europe and the world will pursue their interests in the immediate post-war period within the framework of a three-power system, the internal political forces and the tradition of national autonomy are likely to be sufficiently strong to constitute a series of independent factors. Although it is doubtless true that each of the great powers is unilaterally capable of overrunning and subjugating its smaller neighbors, it is probable that this course of action would be taken only if a smaller country adopted policies definitely inimical to the essential interests of its great power neighbor. It is likely, for example, that Russia will try to achieve her major interests in respect to Poland while allowing full domestic autonomy to a Polish Government. It is more than doubtful whether British or American intervention could determine the political complexion of the basic policies of France. The interests and traditions of such countries will have to be taken into account by the great powers and the influence of any of the great powers on its little neighbor will be small unless it is adapted to the dominant interests of the great power in the country in question.

3. That a swing to the political left in Europe will lead to a swing into the Russian orbit.

There is a strong likelihood that the various complexions will be determined in Europe in the post-war period. It is possible, however, except in those cases where the

SECRETANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "B"

Certain misconceptions are common in current discussions of the European settlement. Some of the more important of these misconceptions are set forth below, as of possible background value to you in connection with your conversations on this question:

1. That any unilateral extension by the great powers of their territories and spheres of influence is incompatible with a durable and effective international security cooperation.

It is certain that, at the end of the war, all three of the great powers, and China as well, will present territorial claims which they will regard as too closely connected with their own security interests to be properly the subject of international negotiation. Possible American claims were stated in the first section of this memorandum. At the least, Russia will certainly re-establish approximately her expanded frontiers of 1914 regardless of other interests and attitudes. Britain will, in all probability, seek to enlarge her position on the North African coast, and in the Near East, partly at the expense of the former Italian empire. Furthermore, countries geographically near one of the great powers or affiliated through bonds of economic or cultural interest will fall, in some sense, into the orbit of such a power. For example, we may expect that Bulgaria will be more interested in Russia than in other powers, that the historic connection between Britain and Portugal will be maintained and that the relations between the United States and various Latin American countries will be strengthened.

Such historically and geographically conditioned relations between the great powers and their satellites, however, in many cases be regarded as inevitable and should be accepted by all concerned. While it is true that the building of spheres of influence which would be necessary to permit, as a condition of settlement,

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practical course of action which holds possibilities of the establishment of a stable Germany within a stable Europe appears to be the creation of conditions within which a popularly based and relatively independent German government, balanced between Britain and Russia, could come to power. The creation of such conditions would involve, at a minimum, agreement among the great powers (a) not to give active support to any of the contending forces in Germany, but while suppressing violence to accept democratic political change, and (b) to pursue domestic and external policies designed to promote economic expansion and a relatively free course of international trade. Although severe treatment of Germany is clearly essential in the post-war period, the policy should be made capable of modification as and when peaceful, democratic forces become clearly ascendant in Germany.

In most of the Continental countries other than Germany, as well, governments not exclusively oriented to either Russia or Britain are the sine qua non for the avoidance of very serious friction between these two powers, and thus for the security of Britain (and the United States). The danger of such exclusive orientation can be reduced only by strengthening of intra-European relationships. This implies, in the long run, some form of European union not directed against either Britain or Russia, but integrated with both.

To secure our objectives, in dealing with Russia and Britain, we shall need to increase our influence by working in concert with those forces in Europe which have real potential for achieving political power. This implies an active policy. We must make full, immediate use of our potential political influence if a stable and secure basis of accommodation is to be achieved.

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practical purposes, non-existent. If partition is the answer, it will have to be imposed; it cannot be induced. It must, furthermore, be recognized that the cession of territory to contiguous states can proceed sufficiently far to be the equivalent of partition. The ceding of all German territory east of the Oder to Poland, for example, may be expected to have the same result as partition in the sense that it would set up in the rest of Germany an irredentism so acute as to dominate, for the foreseeable future, both the internal political structure and the foreign policy of Germany. Such a foreign policy must have as its aim the creation of a system of alliances with western powers oriented against Russia.

Nevertheless, partition either in this or some other form may well be accepted as a basis of accommodating interests in default of substantial hope of pursuing courses (a) or (b). There are, furthermore, certain immediate post-war influences which may work in the direction of partition. It must be recognized, however, that the stability of such a settlement would be dependent upon the continuous availability of sufficient force to back it up. A zonal occupation of Germany may be used by the respective powers as a competitive device; a migration of population or political lines may occur from east to west and vice versa; such separatist movements as may emerge from a political struggle between right and left will seek support from the occupying powers. In an atmosphere of mutual suspicion it would be difficult to find a basis for agreement among the great powers other than partition. Nevertheless, for reasons already stated, in this direction lies eventual conflict.

Conclusion

The crux of the European settlement is Germany. In the post-war settlement of Germany and the extraction of heavy reparations payments may be taken for granted. Beyond this, the only

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German government as satisfactory and consider the minimum of five years which is required to convert an economically wealthy power into a militarily strong power as adequate for the application of such preventive measures as might be necessary for Russia's security. The interests of England and the United States would be so well served by an economically prosperous Germany that we may assume the acceptance of any non-Nazi political regime not positively oriented toward Russia. If self-sufficiency measures are abandoned and if the German economy is integrated into the European and world economies on a basis of efficient specialization, economic prosperity would not imply high war potential unless Germany had allies able to furnish food and raw materials.

It is altogether improbable, however, that a non-Nazi regime, relatively neutral between east and west, could be established in Germany by the positive action of the three powers. In fact, a government established by such means would be sure to be unacceptable to Germany and hence without power. The only real chance of the emergence in Germany of a stable, popular and relatively neutral government lies in an indigenous political movement with which the great powers agree not to interfere. To bring this about, it is essential that the three powers be prepared (1) while preventing violence to accept democratic political change in Germany, (2) to pursue domestic and external policies designed to provide economic expansion and liberal conditions of world trade.

The degree of mutual confidence and self-restraint involved for the three powers in following such a policy is obviously considerable.

(c) Partition of Germany.

It can be stated categorically that the existence of indigenous separatist tendencies in Germany is not to be nurtured by the allies. It is essential that the territory of Germany into separate states be maintained.

JUNE 1945

(5) ~~ARRANGING~~ OF GERMANY. (Discussed under "a" below.)

The problem of the German and the general European settlement is the discovery of a basis of accommodation on which the security interests of the three great powers can be reconciled. Questions involving territory to be ceded by Germany to contiguous states will lead to serious division among the powers only if such cessions are equivalent to a partition of Germany. More difficult are questions having to do with the economic and political structure of Germany and the extent and character of external influence deemed necessary to bring about a regime more or less satisfactory to the major powers.

Three possible bases of attempted accommodation need to be distinguished, it being assumed that whatever policy is followed, will include a thorough-going demilitarization of Germany.

(a) ~~ARRANGING~~ WEAK GERMANY.

There is some evidence that present Russian intentions are in the direction of keeping Germany weak for a considerable period of years. Britain and the United States might decide to run a policy on the ground that since Germany may fall into the Russian orbit, it is better to have her weak than strong. Her casualties and immediate post-hostilities measures alone will keep Germany weak for at least a generation. It is obvious, however, that to keep Germany weak, though united, would require a degree of continuous intervention that, for domestic political reasons, would be impossible for the western powers. As a long-term policy, this is definitely not in the interest of England or the United States.

(b) ~~AN ECONOMICALLY PROSPEROUS GERMANY.~~

Clearly neither Russia nor England would favor the restoration of an economically prosperous Germany if either were convinced that the political orientation of such a Germany was inevitably in the direction of the other power. Russia might, however, regard a pacific and neutrally disposed

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of a serious threat from Russia. Unless Britain (and the United States) are disposed to trust entirely to Russian goodwill in this matter, they will make the best possible use of their trading position, in dealing with Russia, to prevent the formation of this great east-European power bloc. Obviously the maintenance of a balance between that expansion of Russian influence which is inevitable -- and acceptable -- and that expansion which it is necessary and possible to avoid will be difficult.

(4) An attempt by Britain to secure Germany's allegiance to a British sphere of influence in Western Europe.

When German resistance ends, the ratio of British (and American) military strength to Russian strength will be higher than it is likely to be for many years thereafter. If in the early post-war period the relations between Britain and Russia are strained, Britain may attempt during the period of occupation to win the allegiance of Germany. But it is unlikely that this acute stage of competition with Russia will develop at this time. Over the longer term, however, Britain, as the weakest member of the three great powers, faced with the fact of rapidly expanding Russian strength, might seek to improve her power position on the continent through a series of measures which, it would be hoped by the British, might lead to the inclusion of Germany in a western European power grouping. Since, however, Russia's principal long-term security interest is in assuring that Germany will not be used as a base and participant to military operations against the USSR, we must assume that she would take effective steps -- up to and including reoccupation -- to prevent Germany as a unit from adhering to such a power group. It is possible, however, that through partition, or agreement of Germany might adhere to a western power group.

JUL 1942

Approved for Release by NSA on 08-12-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526

and of institutions, may be expected to keep Germany weak for at least a generation, it will probably be found impracticable to keep Germany permanently weak without partition. To do so would require an active intervention in German affairs, which is impracticable, at least for England and the United States, for more than a relatively few years. Russian withdrawal from Germany would almost certainly be conditioned by the emergence of a national government friendly -- or at least not unfriendly -- towards the Soviet Union. It is a possibility, which must be prepared against, that such a government might ally itself with, or be subservient to, Russia; indeed Russia might refuse to withdraw her army of occupation until this Soviet orientation is established. However, the outcome will be influenced not only by the attitude of Russia, but by the prospects open to Germany within Europe. If these prospects include the possibility of an integration of Germany into the larger economy of central and western Europe, and if the political complexion of the countries concerned is not too dissimilar, the probabilities are that Germany will seek a European rather than a Russian orientation. A vindictive peace for which Russia bore the prime responsibility might facilitate this orientation. But if this means an orientation that will help to build a balance of power against the Soviet Union, the chances are small that the USSR will permit it at any time that can now be foreseen.

(3) A DIVIDED GERMANY, WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN DOMINANT POSITION, AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DIVISION.

This is a less unlikely short term development than an independently aggressive Germany, or a united Germany allied with (or joining) the USSR. With the USSR in control of the resources and manpower of the industrialized world, a divided Germany forming an easy victim to the USSR, the security position of Britain would be much less secure than at present.

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The chief opposition to a movement in the direction of any union of Europe that excludes Russia would come from that power, but if the indigenous forces are strong and not oriented against Russia, it is by no means certain that this opposition would be permanent. Almost any form of European unification not oriented toward Russia and away from the Anglo-Saxon powers would be in the long-run interests of England and the United States. Politically it would help to restore an effective balance of power in the world; economically it offers the prospect of a prosperous Europe, which is one of the conditions of a prosperous world economy. Although such a union of non-Russian Europe is out of the question so long as the present stated policy of the Soviet Union is not changed, a European union effectively integrated with both Britain and the Soviet Union offers, over the longer term, perhaps the most hopeful prospect of peaceful accommodation.

(2) A Soviet Germany allied with (or joining) the USSR.

It may be presumed that a Soviet Germany allied with the USSR would be regarded by Great Britain (and the United States) as a threat to British (and American) security. The USSR probably considers that in the early post-war period these powers would be able to exert sufficient influence upon events in the British and American zones of occupation in Germany to check any such revolutionary tendency. Moreover, the USSR probably does not consider that Germany will be ripe for communism and desirable as an ally in the early post-war years. Also, the USSR sets some value upon the goodwill and the economic assistance of Britain and the United States. It appears that at present Russian policy is directed toward securing a weak Germany rather than a Soviet Germany.

A Soviet Germany allied with Russia can be regarded, therefore, as highly improbable in the early post-war period.

Although war casualties, possibly including the retention of war prisoners for use as forced labor, etc., the

SECRET**(1) An independently aggressive Germany.**

It is natural that attention in the United States should be primarily focussed on the first of these dangers. After Germany's defeat, and the accompanying elimination of active Nazis, the re-emergence of an independently aggressive Germany can, however, be definitely excluded for at least a generation, if only because, (a) the USSR will be disposed, and strong enough, to take any preventive action that may be needed, and (b) the manpower position of Germany in the combat age groups will be impaired for at least a generation. In the power position which will prevail for at least a generation after this war, Germany could menace the peace of Europe only as an ally of Britain or of Russia.

Over a longer term the probable course of events becomes increasingly speculative but certain powerful, indigenous forces of recent and current development in Europe west of Russia should be noted. The pressure for some form of unification of non-Soviet Europe is widespread even at the expense of a considerable sacrifice of national sovereignty. Hitler attempted to turn this force to account, and if the Nazi accent had been less on German domination and more on pan-Europe, the Nazi position would probably have been much stronger than it is today. Currently the reaction to Nazi oppression has tended to create new and stronger bonds among resistance groups opposing German domination in different countries. However, in any form of European union that excludes Russia the German position, both economically and politically, will inevitably be strong even if considerable German territory were ceded, after the war, to adjoining countries. A strong leftward movement is in train in almost all European countries and there is a fair prospect that within a few years after the end of the war Europe, exclusive of Russia, will exhibit a more homogeneous political structure and outlook than at any time within the last century and a half.

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Appendix to Enclosure "A"

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power as incompatible with our security, and we would again take any measures required to prevent a major attack on the United States without the neutralization of the British Isles appears virtually impossible.

(2) A satisfactory basis of accommodation in Europe is necessary to a satisfactory settlement in the Far East. All three of the great powers have vital interests in the Far East, as well as in Europe. These interests are either going to be compromised in some mutually satisfactory fashion or they will be pursued unilaterally in a manner destined to divide the world into conflicting spheres of influence. Both Great Britain and Russia have direct security interests in the European settlement. The interest of the United States, while indirect, is no less real. If a mutually satisfactory solution cannot be found in Germany and Europe, all three powers will attempt, elsewhere in the world, to follow that course of action best designed to strengthen the individual power position of each. The policy which the United States must pursue in the Far East and in Latin America in the event of continued Anglo-Russian rivalry in Europe will, therefore, be very different than it would be if Anglo-Russian interests in Europe could be satisfactorily compromised.

The nature of our security interest in the European settlement requires us to consider the circumstances under which Britain might become involved in a European war which would threaten the security of the British Isles. The conditions may be mentioned:

- (1) emergence of an independently aggressive Germany;
- (2) a Soviet Germany allied with Germany in Europe;
- (3) a disarmed Germany, with the loss of its military potential, of the manpower and resources of the German people, and the withdrawal of the Reich;
- (4) an attempt by Britain to establish a British sphere of influence in Europe;
- (5) a partition of Germany.

JCS 1014

(1) Development and extension of the protection of the approaches to the Caribbean;

(2) Co-ordination of hemisphere defense plans with Latin American countries, and the maintenance of strategically important military installations on Latin American territory;

(3) Maintenance and extension of military installations in eastern Canada, Newfoundland, Greenland and possibly Iceland;

(4) Development of a base in West Africa.

(b) Secure its position in the Pacific by some or all of the following measures:

(1) Maintenance and development of military installations in Alaska and the Aleutians;

(2) Acquisition of, and the construction of bases in, Japanese-mandated islands;

(3) Development of bases in the Far East under American or combined control.

II. American Interests in Europe

The American interest in the European settlement is primarily one of security. Our real economic interests are of distinctly secondary importance. In the event of sustained and wide-spread unemployment in the United States, we may come to attach an exaggerated importance to European markets for our exports and to European competition in other foreign markets. For the present, however, our security interest must be accepted as paramount.

Our security interest in the European settlement follows directly from two factors:

(1) Despite the expenditure of much effort and money, and maintenance in the future of a substantial sea, air, and military force, we shall be unable to prevent the conquest or neutralization of the British Isles by any other power.

SECRETAPPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "B"OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.

17 July 1944

To: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan
 From: Research and Analysis Branch
 Subject: American Security Interests in the European Settlement

OSS operations in Europe in the period after cessation of hostilities will have to be planned and conducted on the basis of a comprehensive, working doctrine regarding American interests in the European settlement. Without the guidance of an authoritative statement of doctrine, the efforts of OSS to adapt its activities to the new requirements of national policy in the post-surrender period would be seriously hampered. While the fighting is still going on, broad strategic guidance will continue to be furnished to OSS through the Joint Chiefs of Staff; thereafter, however, guidance will be required chiefly at the level of general foreign policy.

The analysis of American security interests in the European settlement presented in this memorandum has been prepared to assist you in your discussions looking toward authoritative guidance of this sort. The views here expressed have been developed in a series of discussions among the senior members of the Research and Analysis Branch.

I. Assumptions regarding Atlantic and Pacific Peace

It is assumed that, regardless of the settlement in Europe, the United States will,

- (a) Secure its position in the Atlantic by attaining all--of the following measures

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These made are consistent with American foreign policy and that considerations are presented which would constitute a proper guide for us in carrying out our intelligence activities.

/s/ WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

1 Incl:
Memo dated 17 July 1944 from R & A Branch to Brig. General
Donovan

Dissemination:
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
The Secretary of State

1034

SECRETENCLOSURE "B"

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

I have given consideration to the carrying on of intelligence activities in Europe during the period following cessation of hostilities. In order to meet the new problems with which we will be confronted, it is necessary for us to have an understanding of the security interests of America in the settlements as well as of the conditions that may exist in the period immediately following the fighting.

Throughout the fighting the accent has been on operational intelligence, during the post-fighting period the emphasis will of necessity be on the political, economic and social.

We therefore will need guidance on this statement of doctrine in order to meet the new requirements of national policy. With that in mind I have had prepared for me, by our research reports in the European field, an analysis of American security interests in the European settlement. I enclose a memorandum presenting these views.

While I do not agree with all of them, I do feel that they are well considered and well stated and at least present a basis upon which a doctrine for our guidance could be outlined. I would greatly appreciate therefore your examination of this paper in order to instruct me as to whether or not the assumptions

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Enclosure "B"

SECRETAPPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "A"DRAFTREPLY TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Reference is made to your memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 4 August 1944, enclosing a letter from the Research and Analysis Branch of your office and requesting instructions as to whether or not the considerations contained in the enclosed letter constitute a proper guide for carrying out the intelligence activities of your Services.

Activities of the Office of Strategic Services in Europe after the collapse of Germany should remain under the control of the United States Theater Commander, who can best determine in what manner and to what extent such activities can be employed most usefully in furtherance of our national policies. It is, therefore, deemed unnecessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give consideration at this time to your memorandum of 4 August.

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ENCLOSURE

CSS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE
FOLLOWING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

References: a. J.C.S. 155 Series
 b. C.G.S. 633
 c. J.C.S. 723 Series
 d. J.C.S. 973 Series

Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To recommend action to be taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to a memorandum from the Director, Office of Strategic Services, dated 4 August 1944, requesting guidance concerning intelligence activities in Europe by his office following cessation of hostilities.

DISCUSSION

2. The Office of Strategic Services is an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with the general functions of espionage, counter-espionage, research, analysis, morale subversion and physical subversion (J.C.S. 155/11/D).

3. "All activities of this office within organized theaters of areas are subject to direct control by the commander concerned. He is authorized to utilize the organization and facilities of the Office of Strategic Services in his theater or area in any manner and to the maximum extent desired by him." (Par. 12 of Enclosure to J.C.S. 155/11/D). In the exercise of this control, the Supreme Commander is responsible for the policies governing this agency in operations within his theater or area. Consequently, it is not necessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to concern themselves with the future role of this agency in any theater or area of Europe.

RECOMMENDATION

4. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve and forward to the Director, Office of Strategic Services, the report on the subject of the Appendix.

JAN 1945

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFOSS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE
FOLLOWING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIESNote by the Secretaries

1. A memorandum from the Director of Strategic Services, dated 1 August 1944 (Enclosure "B"), transmitting a memorandum from the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services was referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for comment and recommendation.

2. The enclosed report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. McFARLAND,

E. D. GRAVES, JR.,

Joint Secretariat



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.




23 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Papers

ENCLOSURES: JCS 1035, Copy No. 57, Subject: OSS Intelligence Activities in Europe Following Cessation of Hostilities
JCS 1038, and Decision Amending, Copy No. 64
Subject: Proposed Accreditation of Military and Naval Attaches to the Czechoslovakian Government

The enclosures listed above are furnished herewith for your information and file.


CECIL J. GRIMEY,
Colonel, GSC,
Assistant Secretary.

SECRET

3. It is desired that the U.S. Group, Control Council, avail itself of the established organization and resources of the Office of Strategic Services rather than to attempt to organize a new body with similar objectives. However, it is absolutely essential that, so long as Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force remains responsible for the conduct of Allied affairs and the occupation of Germany, all Offices of Strategic Services activities in Germany must be carried on strictly in accordance with policies prescribed by that Headquarters, and must be controlled by the G-2 Division thereof.

4. Subject to this reservation, it is recommended that the Office of Strategic Services be authorized to establish and operate a special mission for Germany, consisting of its own personnel and equipment, to accompany, assist and eventually to serve under the direction and control of the U.S. Group, Control Council, in connection with German disarmament, military government and other matters at the discretion of the U.S. representative on the Control Council.

For the Theater Commander:

/s/ W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff

ENCLOSURE

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Chief of Staff

13 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Office of Strategic Services Mission for Germany.

TO : The Secretary,
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, D.C.

1. The Office of Strategic Services has established in the European Theater of Operations an extensive intelligence and research organization which is staffed by well qualified personnel. An extension of its activities into the period of occupation would be of great value to the U.S. Group, Control Council, particularly in connection with disarmament and military government activities. The intelligence and research resources developed by the Office of Strategic Services would be of special advantage in detecting and frustrating inevitable German attempts to evade the surrender terms. They would also be of assistance in anticipating and solving questions arising in connection with military government policy and administration. Some potentially useful activities are indicated in the attached papers.*

2. The Office of Strategic Services has developed its resources and plans with a view to extending its activities to Germany during the surrender and occupation period, and has stated its willingness and desire to establish and operate a Special Office of Strategic Services Mission in Germany to assist the U.S. Group, Control Council, and to serve under the direction and control of the group. Sufficient personnel and organizations exist to enable this to be done without placing upon the Army and Navy Departments for additional assistance.

* Available on call to the Secretariat.

SECRET

1141
COPY NO. 51

J.C.S. 1035/1

20 September 1944

Pages 21 - 22 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

ESTABLISHMENT OF O.S.S. MISSION FOR GERMANY
Reference: J.C.S. 1035

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed letter from Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, European Theater of Operations, dated 13 September 1944, has been referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for comment and recommendation.

A. J. McFARLAND,

E. D. GRAVES, JR.,

Joint Secretariat.

J.C.S. 1035/1



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET



21 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR STRATEGIC SERVICES

SUBJECT: Establishment of O.S.S. Mission for
Germany

ENCLOSURE: J.C.S. 1035/1, 20 Sep 44, Copy No. 61,
subject as above

The above enclosure is forwarded herewith for your
information and file.

Cecil J. Gridley
CECIL J. GRIDLEY,
Colonel, OSG,
Assistant Secretary.

SECRET

JCS 1035/1 - Establishment of USS Mission
for Germany

Distribution: 22 Sep 44

✓
SECRET

- 1 IG: Col. Onthank
 - 2 JMA: Dr. Langer
 - 3 JAI: Mr. O'Gara
 - 4 JES: Col. Sands
 - 5 JFO: Lt. Wilson
 - 6 Secretariat
 - 7 Files
- X. ✓

TOP SECRETA P P E N D I XD R A F TDISPATCH TO COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FOR THE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Reference letter your headquarters 13 September 1944,
subject Office of Strategic Services Mission for Germany,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve your proposal in principle,
but desire plans for the formation of the special mission
showing scope, organization and numbers of personnel to be
be concerted between your headquarters and Office of Strategic
Services and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
final approval.

*sent for
Cm - OUT - 39374
31 Sept
War 39374*

205 1035/2

TOP SECRET

4. There seems to be no over-riding reason to object to the proposal of Headquarters, United States Army Forces, European Theater of Operations and the recommendation of the commander on the spot should be approved in principle. However, it would seem to be undesirable for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give blanket approval to the formation of a special mission by the Office of Strategic Services without some idea of what is involved, particularly as to personnel.

RECOMMENDATION

5. That a message, substantially as set forth in the Appendix be sent to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, European Theater of Operations.

JCS 1035/2

TOP SECRETE N CESTABLISHMENT OF OGERMAN

Reference: J

Report by the Joint Strategic CommitteeTHE PROBLEM

1. To submit recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject, (J C.S. 1035/1).

DISCUSSION

2. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, European Theater of Operations, has requested the establishment of a special Office of Strategic Services Mission to serve under the United States Group, Control Council, after this group assumes control of the United States zone of occupation in Germany. Meanwhile, and as long as Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force remains responsible for the conduct of Allied affairs in Germany, all Office of Strategic Services activities are to be carried on in accordance with policies prescribed by that headquarters and controlled by the G-2 Division thereof.

3. The Acting Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department opposes projecting the Office of Strategic Services into the Control Council, since he considers the existing personnel of the Army, Navy and Air Corps sufficient to deal with the situation. He recommends that such personnel of the Office of Strategic Services, as may be required, be transferred into the Control Council as individuals and that the staff and research resources in the possession of the Office of Strategic Services be made available to the Control Council and Commanding General of the United States Forces in Germany.

JCS 1035/2

TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 66J.C.S. 1035/226 September 1944Pages 23 - 25, incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFESTABLISHMENT OF O.S.S. MISSION FOR GERMANYReferences: A. J.C.S. 1035
B. J.C.S. 1035/1Note by the Secretaries


1. J.C.S. 1035/1 was referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for comment and recommendation.

2. The enclosed report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. McFARLAND,
E. D. GRAVES, JR.,
Joint Secretaries.

Approved 30 Oct 1944
(D)

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EXHIBIT 125 010

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APPENDIX "D"

The detailed proposal referred to in paragraph 6, page 1, herein is not reproduced here because of its volume. It is on file in the Secretariat and is available on request (J.P.S. 610/D). The summary of the proposal is contained in Appendix "C" herein.

JCS 1036/3

Appendix "D"

SECRET

Meantime London Office of OSS has been directed to
form small nucleus of OSS Officers to assist US Group CC
during planning period.

End

OS-11-11347 (11 Feb 45) DTG 111645A MCS

APPENDIX " "

SECRETAPPENDIX "C"

Final Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
 Rear, London, England.

To: War Department

11 February 1946

Ref: R 15909

R 15909 to AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff from SHAFF
 letter from Wickersham from Smith signed Eisenhower.

London office of OSS has submitted a proposal for an
 OSS Mission to Germany in accordance with JCS 1035/2. Plan
 envisages continuation in Germany of recognized OSS functions
 in this theater including secret intelligence, counter
 espionage and reporting on political, economic and social
 developments in Germany, under appropriate (-) and command
 attention.

Mission contemplates ultimate personnel of 208 officers
 and professional, and 286 enlisted and clerical for all Germany,
 half of whom would be stationed outside Berlin and subject to
 military command control, the head officer to accompany and
 assist US Group CC, subject however to G-2 SHAFF control during
 initial period of responsibility, and thereafter to serve under
 US Group Control Council (CC) through intelligence coordinating
 section of US Group CC.

Provision is made that the acting deputy will act as the
 OSS Mission works in close cooperation and coordination with
 military adviser. Murphy has been consulted and concurs in
 proposed period of Military Control in Germany.

Proposed recommending approval have been forwarded.

See Appendix "C"

SECRET

5. It is essential that United States intelligence activities in the theater be fully coordinated to avoid duplication of personnel and effort and to insure that intelligence resources are fully and properly utilized for the benefit of all interested agencies. This apparently could be accomplished by the Joint Intelligence Committee. However, the existing uncertainty of the relationships which will exist during the occupation period raises so many imponderables that it is questionable if an intelligent decision can be made at this time on the merits of the OSS plan as projected beyond the termination of combined command. That is not true of the present period (of SHAEF responsibility), in which the mission is supervised by the G-2 Division of SHAEF.

6. In view of the fact that the organization and control of United States forces for the occupation of Germany is still undetermined, the practicable solution to this problem would seem to be approval of the plan for the SHAEF period and to note that relationships with OSS will be subject to reconsideration as soon as a decision is reached concerning United States organization to follow the termination of combined command. This reservation is made in paragraph 4 g of General Wickersham's letter of 18 December 1944 to General Smith but should be emphasized to indicate the degree to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the current proposal.

* General Wickersham's letter is contained in pages 7 and 8 of the detailed proposal (see Appendix "D" here to).

WHI 1032/3

Since all operating OSS personnel for the mission would be provided by OSS without further demand upon the War and Navy Departments no problem is considered to exist on this point.

It is noted that during the SHAEF period of responsibility the mission would be subject to the supervision of G-2, SHAEF. However, the mission would be under the Commanding General (CG), U.S. Group of the Control Council through the Intelligence Committee. The precise details of organization and functions of the latter organization have not been determined, but presumably it would be a policy-forming body, without operating functions, on which the United States Intelligence members of the various divisions of the Control Council, and OSS, would be represented. Since OSS is discharging an operating service of the theater commander, it might then, under his direction, perform intelligence operating functions, with the intelligence produced being furnished to the various divisions of the U.S. Group, Control Council, which does not have a separate intelligence establishment in the present scheme of organization. Under this concept the senior member of the Joint Intelligence Committee would serve, in effect, as the intelligence officer for the CG, U.S. Group, Control Council.

Article 3 (a) of the tripartite agreement on control machinery in Germany (Appendix "C," JCS 1130/1) provides that the commander-in-chief of United States forces in Germany, i.e., the U.S. Zone Commander, together with the British and Soviet commanders-in-chief, will constitute the control council. Therefore, the CG, U.S. Group, Control Council apparently will serve in a dual capacity.

SECRETAPPENDIX "B"DISCUSSION

1. The present OSS directive (paragraph 12 c, Enclosure to JCS 1035/11/b) provides that all OSS activities "within organized theaters or areas are subject to direct control by the commander concerned who is authorized to utilize the organization and facilities of the Office of Strategic Services in his theater or area in any manner and to the maximum extent desired by him." Referring to the foregoing provision, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee concluded in paragraph 3 of JCS 1035 (the recommendation in which paper was approved by informal action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 Sept 1944) that:

"In the exercise of this control, the Supreme Commander is responsible for the policies governing this agency in operations within his theater or area. Consequently, it is not necessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to concern themselves with the future role of this agency in any theater or area of Europe."

However, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee later concluded (paragraph 4, JCS 1035/2) that while there seemed to be no over-riding objection to the theater commander's proposal for a special OSS mission in Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not give blanket approval "without some idea of what is involved, particularly personnel." The present theater plan for an OSS mission in Germany has been submitted by General Eisenhower as the result of approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the recommendations in JCS 1035/1. This paper caused the theater commander to be informed that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the proposal in principle, they desired that plans showing scope, organization and numbers of personnel involved be submitted for final approval.

JCS 1035/3

SECRET**APPENDIX "A"****DRAFT****MESSAGE TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES,**
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Plans for the OSS mission for Germany are approved.
(To Eisenhower from Joint Chiefs of Staff cite R 1 109 and
letter dated 9 February 1945 referred to therein) It is
noted that relationships with OSS will be subject to review
as respects the post-SHAEP period of responsibility.

Jed 10/1/5

SECRETCONCLUSIONS

11. a. Detailed plans for the OSS mission in Germany should be approved as submitted by the theater commander, because:

(1) Under approved policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the precise details of intra-theater organization for OSS are a responsibility of the theater commander, and,

(2) No additional personnel would be required.

b. Since the organization and control of United States forces in Europe have not been finally determined, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should note the theater commander's reservation, that following the dissolution of SHAEP, the relationships with OSS will be subject to review.

RECOMMENDATION

12. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusion in paragraph 11 b (above) and that the message in Appendix "A" (page 23) be dispatched to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, European Theater of Operations.

SECRET

5. By J.C.S. 1035/2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that while the project was approved in principle, plans for the mission should be concerted between the headquarters and the OSS and submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final approval.

6. The theater commander has now submitted a detailed proposal (appendices "C" and "D") envisaging continuation in Germany of recognized OSS functions under the supervision of G-2, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, (SHAEP), for the present, and under the Commanding General, U.S. Group, Control Council for Germany following the SHAEP period of responsibility. Ultimate personnel of 493 (208 officers and professional and 285 enlisted and clerical) would be furnished from OSS resources. An OSS nucleus mission of this character has already been established by SHAEP for planning purposes, pending a decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the present paper.

7. Informal concurrence in the detailed theater plans for an OSS mission for Germany has been given by the Director, OSS.

8. The State Department (Mr. Fletcher Warren) has indicated informally its acceptance of the plan and has so notified Ambassador Murphy.

9. Organization for the control of United States forces in the European Theater of Operations following termination of combined command is now under study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the result of proposals made by General Eisenhower in JCS-13-19185 (19 Feb 45).

DISCUSSION

10. See Appendix "B" (page 30).

JCS 1035/2

COPY NO. 72SECRETJ.C.S. 1035/311 March 1945Pages 26 - 35, incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

J.C.S. MISSION FOR GERMANY
 Reference: a. J.C.S. 1035/2
 b. J.C.S. 1047/1

Report by the Joint Staff PlannersTHE PROBLEM

1. To determine whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff should approve the plan for an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Mission for Germany, as submitted by the theater commander in accordance with the directive in Appendix to J.C.S. 1035/2.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In J.C.S. 1035 the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that OSS activities in Europe following the defeat of Germany should remain under the control of the United States theater commander, "who can best determine in what manner and to what extent such activities can be employed most useful furtherance of our national policies."

3. By J.C.S. 1047/1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Director, OSS, that there would be no independent OSS activities in occupied Germany and that available OSS personnel would be placed at the disposal of the theater commander for integration with Army and Navy forces.

4. J.C.S. 1035/1 circulated a proposal from the Commanding General (CG), U.S. Army Forces, European Theater of Operations for establishment of a special OSS mission to serve in Germany during the occupation period.

JCS 1035/3

- 26 -



SECRET
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SAVE

16 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SUBJECT: O.S.S. Mission for Germany

ENCLOSURE: JCS 1035/3, dtd 11 March 1945, subject
as above, copy #72.

1. The above enclosure is forwarded herewith for your information.
2. This paper is awaiting approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is requested that its status be guarded accordingly.

R. U. Hyde
RALPH U. HYDE,
Captain, USN (Ret.).
Assistant Secretary.

SECRET

16 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SUBJECT: G.C.S. Mission for Germany

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Director, OSS, dated 16 March 1945, with enclosure

1. Reference forwarded copy of J.C.S. 1088/3, and indicated that it was under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 13 April 1945, approved the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of J.C.S. 1088/3.

RALPH W. EYER,
Captain, USN (Ret.)
Assistant Secretary

SECRET

SECRET**SAVE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SUBJECT: O.S.S. Mission for Germany

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Director, OSS, dated 17 March 1945, with enclosure

1. Reference forwarded copy of J.C.S. 1035/3, and indicated that it was under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 April 1945, approved the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of J.C.S. 1035/3.

W. M. Ryan
RALPH U. RYAN,
Captain, USN (Ret.)
Assistant Secretary

SECRET



JPS 610